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I. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal relates to two competing lienhold interests in a failed real estate 
development project in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho, known as Black Rock North. The appellant 
American Bank ("American Bank") provided financing to the owner ofthe project, BRN 
Development, Inc. ("BRN"). American Bank secured its money lent with a mortgage recorded 
against Black Rock North. BRN defaulted on its loan with American Bank, whereupon 
American Bank filed this action to judicially foreclose its mortgage. 
The respondent Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest 
("Wadsworth") was the general contractor responsible for the construction of the golf course that 
encompassed one aspect of Black Rock North. BRN failed to pay Wadsworth for some of 
Wadsworth's work on the project. As a result, Wadsworth filed a claim oflien against Black 
Rock North for its unpaid work on the project. 
American Bank named Wadsworth as a defendant in this action for the purpose of 
foreclosing out Wadsworth's junior lienhold interest. In the proceedings below, the district court 
determined as a factual matter that Wadsworth's claim of lien was subordinate to American 
Bank's mortgage. Additionally, the district court entered a decree of foreclosure that resulted in 
American Bank obtaining a sheriff s deed to the property by American Bank credit bidding the 
amount that BRN owed to American Bank, with no surplus proceeds to pay any junior creditors. 
Notwithstanding the subordination of Wadsworth's claim oflien and that there were no surplus 
proceeds from the foreclosure to pay any junior creditors, the district court held American Bank 
liable for the entirety of Wadsworth's claim oflien because American Bank posted a lien bond to 
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remove Wadsworth's lien from the Black Rock North property. As a result of the judgment 
entered by the district court, American Bank and the bond surety are jointly and severally liable 
to Wadsworth for a judgment in the total amount of$2,425,483.50. 
American Bank now appeals the rulings and judgment entered by the district 
court. American Bank respectfully asserts that the district court misapplied the lien bond statute 
governing American Bank's liability to Wadsworth. l In sum, by posting the lien bond, American 
Bank and the bond surety obligated themselves to pay Wadsworth that sum of money that 
Wadsworth would have recovered by foreclosing its claim oflien against the Black Rock North 
property. As it pertains to this action, because Wadsworth would not have recovered anything 
by foreclosing its lien against the property, the district court should not have allowed Wadsworth 
to recover anything from the lien release bond. At best for Wadsworth, this matter should be 
remanded to give Wadsworth an opportunity to prove the amount it would have recovered by 
foreclosing its lien against the property, after considering the priority of American Bank's 
mortgage. 
Alternatively, given that Wadsworth violated the Idaho Contractor Registration 
Ace by (1) failing to register under the Act at all times it performed work on the project and 
(2) engaging unregistered subcontractors to work on the project, the district court should have 
1 Idaho's Lien Bond Statute, Idaho Code Sections 45-518 through 45-524, is attached to 
this Brief as Addendum A. 
2 Idaho's Contractor Registration Act ("ICRA"), Idaho Code Sections 54-5201 through 
54-5219, is attached to this Brief as Addendum B. 
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dismissed Wadsworth's counterclaim, including its claim to recover against the lien bond, in its 
entirety. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. Proceedings Relating to Underlying Dispute Between American Bank and 
Wadsworth. 
1. On April 1, 2009, American Bank filed this action to foreclose its 
mortgage that secured BRN's debt obligation to American Bank. Clerk's Record ("R") Vol. 1, 
pp. 110-33. American Bank named a number of defendants who filed competing claims against 
the Black Rock North property. One of those defendants was Wadsworth, who filed a claim of 
lien against the Black Rock North property on January 6,2009 (hereinafter the real property 
upon which American Bank and Wadsworth hold competing liens shall be referred to as the 
"Property"). In its Complaint, American Bank asserted that its mortgage was prior and superior 
to Wadsworth's claim of lien and the other competing liens recorded against the Property, and 
American Bank sought to foreclose all such junior liens. Id., p. 120, ~ 2. The principal amount 
that American Bank sought to recover by the foreclosure of its mortgage was $14,600,000.00. 
Id., pp. 119-20, ~~ 1-3. 
2. On May 12, 2009, Wadsworth filed a counterclaim against American 
Bank, wherein Wadsworth sought to foreclose its claim oflien for its unpaid work on the Black 
Rock North project. R Vol. 1, pp. 159-209. In such counterclaim, Wadsworth asserted that its 
claim oflien was prior and superior to' American Bank's mortgage. Id., pp. 168-69, § XL. The 
principal amount that Wadsworth sought to recover through the foreclosure of its claim of lien 
was $2,329,439.72. Id. at p. 170, ~~ 1-3. 
3 Client:2396663.1 
3. On April 7, 2010, American Bank purchased a Release of Mechanic's 
Lien Bond ("Lien Release Bond") for the purpose of bonding around Wadsworth's claim oflien, 
as Wadsworth was at that time the only lienholder claiming priority to American Bank's 
mortgage. R Vol. 4, pp. 0848-88. The Lien Release Bond identifies American Bank as the 
principal posting the bond and International Fidelity Insurance Company ("International 
Fidelity") as the surety. Id., p. 848. The bond issued by International Fidelity contains the 
following language mandated by Idaho Code Section 45-519: 
WHEREAS, American Bank, desires to give a bond for releasing 
the following described real property from that certain claim of 
mechanic's lien in the sum of $2,329,439.72, recorded January 6, 
2009, in the office of the recorder in Kootenai County, Idaho: See 
Exhibit A for Legal Description 
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned principal and surety do 
hereby obligate themselves to Wadsworth Golf Construction 
Company of the Southwest, the claimant named in the mechanic's 
lien, under the conditions prescribed by sections 45-518 through 
45-524, Idaho Code, inclusive, in the sum of Three Million Four 
Hundred Ninety Four Thousand One Hundred Fifty Nine and 
58/100 Dollars ($3,494,159.58), from which sum they will pay the 
claimant such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may 
adjudge to have been secured by his lien, with interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. 
R Vol. 4, p. 848. 
4. On April 14,2010, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-518, et seq. 
("Idaho's Lien Bond Statute"), American Bank petitioned the district court for the release of 
Wadsworth's mechanic's lien against the Property upon the posting of the Lien Release Bond 
with the district court. R Vol. 4, pp. 0670-0762. 
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5. Wadsworth never filed any written objections to American Bank's petition 
for release of Wadsworth's claim of lien upon the posting of the Lien Release Bond. See 
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal ("Tr.") at 7: 17 - 11 :15. Rather, Wadsworth stipulated to the 
entry ofthe order that released its lien against the Property upon the posting of the Lien Release 
Bond. !d. Such stipulated order, entered by the court on April 27, 2010 (R Vol. 4, pp. 0774-76), 
provides: 
• "Petitioner American Bank having presented satisfactory proof as required 
by Idaho Code Section 45-521 that a bond complying with the form 
prescribed by Idaho Code Section 45-519 was procured and paid for .... " 
Id., p. 774, ~ (b). 
• "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that the: (a) Notice of 
Claim of Lien filed by Wadsworth on January 6,2009, and recorded as 
Instrument No. 2191381000, in the records of the Kootenai County 
Recorder, against and the Real Property ... [is] hereby released of record 
for all purposes, but only as to the real property described in Exhibit D, to 
the same extent as if such liens had been released of record by 
Wadsworth ... , and if such claims are asserted by motion pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 45-523 or in an independent action pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 45-522, the bond filed herein shall be subject to the claims 
that would otherwise constitute liens against the above-described 
property." Id., pp. 775-76. 
6. On July 21, 2010, American Bank moved for summary judgment, 
claiming there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the priority of American Bank's 
mortgage over Wadsworth's claim oflien. R VoL 8, pp. 1703-34. 
7. On November 12,2010, Wadsworth responded to American Bank's 
motion for summary judgment and cross-moved for summary judgment against American Bank. 
R VoL 8, pp. 1803-37. In Wadsworth's cross-motion, Wadsworth argued for the first time that 
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American Bank waived its priority defense to Wadsworth's claim oflien by posting the Lien 
Release Bond. Id., pp. 1828-29. 
8. On February 2,2011, the district court denied American Bank's motion 
for summary judgment on the priority issue and granted Wadsworth's cross-motion for summary 
judgment, concluding as a matter oflaw "that by American Bank posting the lien release bond 
and this Court entering its order releasing of record in its entirety and for all purposes 
Wadsworth's mechanic's lien, the issue oflien priority is not relevant." R Vol. 11, p. 2742. 
Then, after finding that American Bank waived its priority defense by posting the Lien Release 
Bond, the district court ordered the parties to trial for all remaining factual disputes, but only for 
those issues relating to the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien. Id., p. 2743. 
9. On February 16,2011, American Bank filed a motion for reconsideration 
ofthe district court's February 2,2011, order that mooted the issue oflien priority. R Vol. 11, 
pp.2746-67. 
10. On April 13,2011, the district court denied American Bank's motion for 
reconsideration, reflecting at oral argument on such motion that: 
So to me there is a distinction between simply the cash bond that 
certainly will assure that someone will get paid and the leverage 
that, I guess, is attenuated to the real estate that, in fact, would 
secure the indebtedness. 
That seems, while it's not directly discussed in a lot of these cases, 
seems to be one of the overall principles of the materialman's lien 
that goes to the very nature of the effectiveness of those liens in 
our business and legal system. 
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So that's just the overall concept that I've struggled with and 
looked at in terms of drawing that distinction between just the 
bond sitting there and the lien on the real property. 
See Tr. at 119:8-23. 
11. On May 2 and 3, 2011, the district court held a two day bench trial on 
issues regarding the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien. See Tr. at 143:1 - 376:5. 
12. On August 22,2011, the district court issued its findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw regarding the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim oflien, ultimately 
concluding that Wadsworth's lien was valid and allowing Wadsworth to collect the principal 
amount of$I,845,697.78 from the Lien Release Bond posted by American Bank. R Vol. 13, 
pp.3207-46. In such memorandum, the district court found: 
• that "Wadsworth was not exempt from registering under the Contractor 
[Registration] Act." (Id., p. 3222.); 
• that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it 
furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing [the golf 
course]' as required by Idaho Code Section 54-5217(2) .... " (Id., p. 3225 
(emphasis in original.); 
• that "Wadsworth engaged in unlawful activity by failing to obtain 
'satisfactory proof of Precision's, Colorado Lining's, and Concrete 
Finishing's [Wadsworth's subcontractors] registration under the 
[Contractor Registration] Act." (Id., p. 3229.); 
• that "under Idaho's mechanic lien statutes and mortgage foreclosure 
statute, American Bank has standing to enforce the terms of the 
Wadsworth Contract [with BRN] including the Golden Releases [lien 
waivers required by Wadsworth's contract with BRN]." (Id., p. 3237.); 
• that pursuant to the language contained in the Golden Releases: 
"Wadsworth agreed to subordinate its lien priority date to other third 
party liens that attached to the property prior to the date inserted in 
the Golden Release"; that "the Golden Release by its express terms 
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included such subordination and waiver terms for the express benefit of 
'any liens or encumbrances attaching to the subject property prior to said 
date,' including American Bank's mortgage lien"; and that "under 
Idaho's mechanic lien statutes and mortgage foreclosure statute, American 
Bank has standing to enforce the terms of the Wadsworth Contract 
including the Golden Releases", or "[a]lternatively, American Bank 
qualifies as a third party beneficiary of Wadsworth's contract with BRN 
DeVelopment." (Id., pp. 3236-37 (emphasis added).); 
• that "Wadsworth may have judgment for said sums [$1,845,697.78] as 
against the bond posted in this matter by American Bank (see February 2, 
2011, Memorandum Decision and Order)." (Id., p. 3243, , 4.). 
13. On October 6,2011, the district court awarded Wadsworth prejudgment 
interest, attorney fees, and costs and entered a judgment in favor of Wadsworth for the principal 
sum of$1,845,697.78, prejudgment interest in the amount of$371,368.82, attorney fees and 
costs in the amount of$208,417.47, for a total judgment of $2,425,484.07, with the total 
judgment accruing post judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.25%. R. Vol. 13, pp. 3331-52. 
Further, the judgment states: "Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest shall 
have said sums in this Judgment as against the bond posted in this matter by American Bank 
given Bond No. 0525542." Id., p. 3352, , 1. Finally, the district court certified the judgment as 
final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., p. 3352. 
14. On November 14, 2011, American Bank filed a notice of appeal ofthe 
district court's Rule 54(b) judgment and the underlying orders supporting such judgment. 
R Vol. 13,pp. 3368-79.3 
3 Wadsworth has agreed to stay execution on the Lien Release Bond during the pendency 
ofthis appeal and in exchange American Bank has agreed to keep the Lien Release Bond in 
effect during the pendency of this appeal. 
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B. Proceedings Relating to the Foreclosure of American Bank's Mortgage. 
15. On July 21,2010, American Bank moved for summary judgment 
regarding the amount that BRN owed to American Bank and seeking an order to judicially 
foreclose its mortgage against all other parties claiming an interest in the Property, which 
remaining parties were not contesting the priority of American Bank's Mortgage. R Vol. 8, 
pp. 1703-34. 
16. By February 24,2011, no party had filed an opposition to American 
Bank's motion for summary judgment regarding either the amount that BRN owed to American 
Bank or the foreclosure of American Bank's mortgage. As a result, on February 24,2011, the 
district court entered an order establishing the amount that BRN owed to American Bank and 
decreeing that the Property be offered for sale for purposes of recovering the sums owed to 
American Bank and foreclosing out all junior interests in the Property. R Vol. 11, pp. 2789-
2809. 
17. On February 24,2011, the district court entered a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure of American Bank's Mortgage ("Foreclosure Decree"). R Vol. 11, pp. 2810-28. In 
such Foreclosure Decree, the district court ordered the Property to be sold by sheriffs sale, with 
the proceeds from such sale to first cover the expenses of the sale, then to pay the receiver's fees, 
then to pay the balance BRN owed to American Bank, with any remaining proceeds to "be 
deposited with the court for payment to the junior creditors in order of their priority as adjudged 
by this court pursuant to Idaho Code Section 45-512 and 45-1302." Id., p. 2814, ~ 5. The same 
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Foreclosure Decree states: "American Bank has the right to credit bid and purchase at the 
Sheriffs Sale." Id., ~ 6. 
18. On May 19,2011, the Property was sold at a foreclosure sale. See 
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, R Vol. 13, p. 3153. At the sale, American Bank made a credit bid 
for the Property in the amount of$18,682,767.78, the amount owing for the costs of sale, 
sheriffs fees, receiver's fees, and the balance BRN owed to American Bank. Id. Because no 
one beat American Bank's credit bid, the Property was sold to American Bank, and there were 
no surplus proceeds to pay junior lienholders. Id. at pp. 3153-54. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The underlying action relates to multiple parties involved in the design, 
construction and financing of a golf course and residential project in Kootenai County, Idaho, 
commonly referred to as the Black Rock North Project ("Project"). BRN was the owner of the 
subject real property and the Project developer. The Project consisted of approximately one 
thousand (1,000) acres. The golf course traverses through the Project and consists of 
approximately two hundred (200) acres of the one thousand (1,000) acre parcel. See R Vol. 12, 
pp. 3005-06, ~ 1; R Vol. 13, p. 3211, ~ 1. 
2. On October 10,2006, BRN entered into a letter of ill tent with Wadsworth, 
whereby Wadsworth was selected as the de facto general contractor for the golf course. Between 
October 2006 and January 2007, BRN and Wadsworth negotiated the terms of a written contract 
culminating in execution of a final contract on or about January 27, 2007 (hereinafter the final 
contract between Wadsworth and BRN shall be referred to as the "Wadsworth Contract"). The 
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Wadsworth Contract required Wadsworth to perfonn certain obligations in exchange for 
payments from BRN. R Vol. 12, pp. 3006-07, ~ 4; R Vol. 13, p. 3212, ~ 4. 
'3. Wadsworth commenced work in October of2006, and continued through 
December of2006. The work perfonned in that initial period included shaping of two of the 
proposed eighteen holes. R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 5; R Vol. 13, p. 3212, ~ 5. 
4. Wadsworth did not obtain a contractor registration license from the Idaho 
Bureau of Occupational Licenses until January 9,2007, after it commenced work on the Project. 
R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 6; R Vol. 13, p. 3213, ~ 6. 
5. On February 2,2007, BRN and American Bank executed loan documents 
whereby American Bank agreed to lend $15 million on a revolving line of credit to BRN for use 
in constructing the golf course and surrounding residential community. The loan documents 
consist of a Revolving Credit Agreement ("Credit Agreement"), a Revolving Credit Note 
("Note") and a Mortgage, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing ("Mortgage") (hereinafter the 
Credit Agreement, Note and Mortgage shall be collectively referred to as the "Loan 
Documents"). American Bank recorded its Mortgage with the Kootenai County Recorder's 
Office on February 6,2007. R Vol. 12, p. 3007, ~ 7; R Vol. 13, p. 3213, ~ 7. 
6. The Loan Documents granted American Bank a first priority mortgage 
lien against the Property. Further, the Loan Documents required BRN to submit loan requests on 
a form prescribed by American Bank ("Loan Requests"). In those Loan Requests, BRN certified 
to American Bank that lien waivers had been obtained from any person who delivered labor, 
services, material or equipment to the Property prior to the date of the Loan Requests. Over the 
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period March 9, 2007, up through September 9,2007, BRN submitted seven (7) Loan Requests 
to American Bank, wherein BRN certified to American Bank in each of those seven Loan 
Requests that BRN had obtained lien waivers from any person who supplied labor, services, 
material or equipment to the Property prior to the date of the Loan Requests. R Vol. 12, 
pp. 3007-08, ~ 8; R Vol. 13, pp. 3213-14, ~ 8. 
7. Wadsworth submitted twenty-five (25) payment applications to BRN for 
Wadsworth's work on the Project, which labor, services and material Wadsworth provided to the 
Project up through November 21,2008. BRN did not submit any payments to Wadsworth until 
Wadsworth submitted a lien waiver to BRN. On certain occasions, Wadsworth submitted a 
release on a form that was attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference into the 
Wadsworth Contract ("Golden Lien Release"). On other occasions, Wadsworth submitted its 
own lien waiver that it had used on other construction projects ("Arizona Release"). R Vol. 12, 
pp. 3008-09, ~ 9; R Vol. 13, p. 3214, ~ 9. 
8. The Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth executed and submitted to 
BRN and the Golden Lien Release form incorporated by reference into the Wadsworth Contract 
all state: 
Upon receipt of payment of the sum of $ , the 
undersigned waives any and all right to any lien whatever and 
releases all rights to lien or claim any lien against the real property 
associated with the above Project by the undersigned in connection 
with any and all work or labor performed, materials, equipment, 
goods, or things supplied or furnished, or any other claims or 
obligations owed through the date shown above, on the above-
named Project. 
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* * * 
In addition, upon receipt of the payment stated above, the 
undersigned agrees that any lien that may be filed for work 
performed after said date will only have lien priority from and after 
the date stated above and will be subordinate to any liens or 
encumbrances attaching to the subject property prior to said date. 
See Trial Exs. 1, and 29-34. Wadsworth submitted six (6) Golden Lien Releases to BRN. For 
each of the six Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth submitted to BRN, BRN paid Wadsworth 
the dollar sum that is referenced in each of those six Golden Lien Releases. The date of the last 
Golden Lien Release is March 19,2008. R Vol. 12, p. 3009,,10; R Vol. 13, p. 3214,,11. 
9. Wadsworth subcontracted out a portion of the work that it was obligated to 
perform as per the Wadsworth Contract. On October 15,2006, Wadsworth and Precision 
Irrigation, Inc. ("Precision") entered into a written subcontract agreement (the "Precision 
Agreement"). The Precision Agreement obligated Precision to construct an irrigation system for 
the golf course. Precision billed Wadsworth for over $2 million worth of work on the Project. 
Precision never obtained a contractor registration license with the Idaho Bureau of Occupational 
Licenses at any time. R Vol. 12, pp. 3010-11, , 17; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, , 18. 
10. Wadsworth entered into a subcontract agreement with Concrete Finishing, 
Inc. ("Concrete Finishing") to install concrete golf cart paths (the "Concrete Finishing 
Agreement"). Concrete Finishing obtained its contractor registration license from the Idaho 
Bureau of Occupational Licenses on September 11, 2007, 15 days after it began work on the 
Project. R Vol. 12, p. 3011, ,18; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, '19. 
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11. Wadsworth also contracted with Colorado Lining Construction, Inc. 
("Colorado Lining"), which never obtained a contractor registration license. Tr. at 297:9-
298:6; R Vol. 13, p. 3217, ~ 19. 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err by refusing to consider the priority of American 
Bank's Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim oflien and thereby allowing Wadsworth to recover 
$2.4 million from the Lien Release Bond when Wadsworth would have recovered nothing by 
foreclosing its claim of lien against the Property? 
2. Given that Wadsworth breached the ICRA by failing to register under the 
Act at all times it performed work on the Project, did the district court err by allowing 
Wadsworth to recover on its claim oflien? 
3. Given that Wadsworth breached the ICRA by engaging subcontractors 
who failed to register under the Act, did the district court err by allowing Wadsworth to recover 
on its claim oflien? 
4. Did the district court err in awarding Wadsworth prejudgment interest, 
costs and attorney fees? 
V. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
American Bank does not contest any ofthe factual findings ofthe district court. 
Rather, American Bank contests certain legal conclusions ofthe district court, including the 
district court's interpretation ofthe Lien Bond Statute and the ICRA. As such, this Court 
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exercises de novo review of the issues raised on appeal by American Bank. Stonebrook Constr., 
LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374 (Idaho 2012). 
This Court reviews appeals from an order of summary judgment de 
novo, and the "standard of review is the same as the standard used 
by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." ... 
Where "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 
then only a question of law remains, over which this Court 
exercises free review." This Court exercises "free review over 
interpreting a statute's meaning and applying the facts to the law." 
Id. at 376 (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 
461 (2008), Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 
641,644 (2006), and VFP VCv. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 331,109 P.3d 714,719 (2005». 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred by Refusing to Consider the Priority of American 
Bank's Mortgage Over Wadsworth's Claim of Lien, Thereby Allowing 
Wadsworth to Collect Over $2.4 Million From the Lien Bond When 
Wadsworth Would Have Recovered Nothing by Foreclosing Its Claim of 
Lien Against the Property. 
The district court allowed Wadsworth to recover $2.4 million from the Lien 
Release Bond posted by American Bank even though Wadsworth would have recovered nothing 
by foreclosing its claim oflien against the Property. See Course of Proceedings ("COP") at 
"12-13 and 15-18. More specifically, when granting Wadsworth's motion for partial summary 
judgment, the district court held "that by American Bank posting the lien release bond and this 
Court entering its order releasing of record in its entirety and for all purposes Wadsworth's 
mechanic's lien, the issue oflien priority is not relevant." R Vol. 11, p. 2742. In so holding, the 
district court stated that nothing in Idaho's Lien Bond Statute preserved American Bank's right 
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to assert the priority of its Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim of lien once Wadsworth's lien was 
removed from the Property. R. Vol. 11, p. 2740. 
The legal effect of the district court's ruling was that American Bank waived its 
priority defense by posting the lien bond. The practical effect of the district court's ruling was 
that American Bank gratuitously made itselfliable for the $2,425,483.50 judgment entered in 
favor of Wadsworth because, had American Bank never posted the lien bond, Wadsworth's 
claim oflien would have been foreclosed out by American Bank's Mortgage and thereby 
rendered worthless. See COP at ~~ 15-18. 
The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding 
American Bank and the bond surety liable for a mechanic's lien that would have been foreclosed 
out by American Bank's Mortgage had Wadsworth's claim oflien remained attached to the 
Property. 
1. The district court erred by failing to give effect to all parts of Idaho's 
Lien Bond Statute. 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Hayden 
Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, this Court need not engage in statutory construction and should apply 
the statute's plain meaning. Id. In other words, "[a]n unambiguous statute must be given its 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15,232 
P.3d 330,336 (2010). Further, when interpreting an unambiguous act, this Court must give 
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effect to the "whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the 
provisions." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008). 
The district court's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute is that by posting 
the lien bond, American Bank could only contest the validity and amount of Wadsworth's claim 
oflien, but not lien priority. R Vol. 11, pp. 2741-42 ("The judgment referred to in I.C. § 45-
523(2), is a product ofI.C. § 45-522, of which this Court has determined only validity and the 
amount found due are relevant issues, not lien priority."). But in doing so, the district court erred 
by not considering other provisions ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute that limit Wadsworth's 
recovery to the amount that Wadsworth's lien had been secured by the Property. 
a. Idaho's Lien Bond Statute limits Wadsworth's recovery to the 
amount determined "to have been secured by his lien," a past 
tense phrase that limits Wadsworth's recovery to the amount 
Wadsworth would have recovered by foreclosing its lien 
against the Property. 
When interpreting Idaho's Lien Bond Statute the district court held that "there is 
no mention in I.e. § 45-518, et seq. of any determination oflien priority." R. Vol. 11, p. 2740. 
In so ruling, the district court focused on Idaho Code Section 45-522. Id. (" ... I.C. § 45-522 
provides that Wadsworth's rights include and this Court may award to Wadsworth the amount 
found due to Wadsworth, including costs and fees."). But the district court failed to consider 
other language in Idaho's Lien Bond Statute that limits Wadsworth's recovery, and American 
Bank's liability, to "such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been 
secured by his lien, with interest costs and attorney's fees." See IDAHO CODE § 45-519. By 
failing to give effect to Section 45-519, the district court failed to follow Idaho's long-standing 
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rules of statutory construction that required the district court to give effect to all parts of Idaho's 
Lien Bond Statute. Univ. a/Utah Hasp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 248, 611 P.2d 
1030,1033 (1980) ("[t]his Court is required to give effect to [e]very word, clause and sentence 
of [the] statute, where possible .... "); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 338, 317 P.2d 341,344 
(1957) (" ... all parts of the statute must be given effect ifit can be done."). 
Construing Idaho Code Section 45-522 consistently with the other qualifying 
language ofIdaho Code Section 45-519, and applying the plain meaning of the past tense phrase 
"to have been secured by his lien" found in 45-519, the district court's error becomes clear. The 
past tense phrase "to have been secured" refers to Wadsworth's prior security interest in the 
Property, as opposed to Wadsworth's present security interest in the lien bond. And in this case, 
Wadsworth had no security in the Property because there was not sufficient equity in the 
Property to pay any lien creditors that fell behind American Bank's Mortgage. See Course of 
Proceeding, supra ("COP") at ~~ 15-18. Thus, because Wadsworth had no security in the 
Property and would have recovered nothing by foreclosing its lien against the Property, 
Wadsworth should not recover anything from the lien bond that was intended to put Wadsworth 
in the same position it would have been by foreclosing its lien against the Property. At best for 
Wadsworth, the matter should be remanded to give Wadsworth an opportunity to prove that there 
was sufficient equity in the Property to pay Wadsworth's claim oflien, after giving consideration 
to the priority of American Bank's Mortgage. 
As noted by the district court, "the issue raised [lien priority in an action to 
recover against a lien bond] is one offrrst impression [in Idaho]" and "I.e. §§ 45-518 through 
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45-524 have not previously been interpreted." R Vol. 12, p. 2928. However, numerous cases 
outside ofIdaho support American Bank's argument that Wadsworth's recovery from the lien 
bond should be limited to the same amount it would have recovered by foreclosing its lien 
against the Property . 
. . . [T]he bonding off statute merely releases the real estate from 
the mechanic's lien claim by requiring that payment of the bond be 
"conditioned for the payment of such judgment adjudicating the 
lien or liens to be valid and determining the amount for which the 
same would have been enforceable against the real estate." 
YorkFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hazel, 256 Va. 598, 602, 506 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1998) (quoting 
VA. CODE § 43-70). 
The General Assembly accomplished that purpose by authorizing 
the courts to permit any party who could be adversely affected by 
the enforcement of a mechanic's lien, i.e. "the owner of the 
property affected thereby, the general contractor or other parties in 
interest," to file a bond securing payment of whatever claim 
otherwise could be enforced by judicial sale of the property. 
George W Kane, Inc. v. Nuscope, Inc., 243 Va. 503, 508-09,416 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1992) 
(quoting VA. CODE § 43-71). 
The purpose of Section 49-37 is carried out when the lien can be 
attacked both to declare it entirely invalid or to declare it invalid 
only as to a party who is adversely affected by it. Consequently, 
United Bank had the power under Section 49-37, ifit filed a bond, 
to assert the priority of its mortgage over the PDS lien. 
PDS Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. Double RS, 42 Conn. Supp. 460, 465, 627 A.2d 959, 963 (1992). 
Because recovery on the bond is part ofthe process for enforcing 
the mechanic's lien, authorities from other jurisdictions have 
concluded that a cause of action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is 
substantially the same whether relief is sought against the liened 
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property or against the bond which has been substituted for the 
property. 
Hutnick v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 47 Cal. 3d 456, 463, 763 P .2d 1326, 1330, 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 236 (Cal. 1988). 
[E]ven though a claimant proves the lien is enforceable, its 
recovery may be limited because of prior existing mortgages 
and/or lien claimants competing for the same money. . .. Again, 
the bond only replaces the property that was subject to the lien, and 
the recovery against the bond should be the same as the recovery 
against the property. 
Kevin J. Russell, Mechanics Lien Discharge Bonds, FOR THE DEFENSE, 46 No.9 DRIFTD 58 
(Sept. 2004); accord May Constr. Co. v. Town Creek Constr. & Dev., LLC, __ S.W.3d_, 
2011 Ark. 281,2011 WL 2477185, *4-5 (2011) (affirming district court's consideration of 
priority when assessing a mechanic's lien claimant's ability to collect from a lien bond, but 
reversing and remanding with instructions to apply proper legal standard for determining 
priority). 
In sum, the plain meaning ofthe phrase "to have been secured by his lien" found 
in Idaho Code Section 45-519 refers to the amount that Wadsworth's lien was secured by the 
Property, thus limiting Wadsworth's recovery to the amount that it would have recovered by 
foreclosing its lien against the Property. To hold otherwise, as the district court did, is 
inconsistent with Idaho's rules of statutory interpretation because it ignores the language of 
Idaho Code Section 45-519. 
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b. Wadsworth's interpretation ofthe phrase "to have been 
secured by his lien" is unreasonable, leads to an absurd and 
unreasonably harsh result, and defeats the purpose of Idaho's 
Lien Bond Statute. 
Wadsworth argues that the phrase "to have been secured by his lien" only requires 
Wadsworth to prove that its lien attached to the Property and not that Wadsworth's lien was 
"secured" in the sense that there was sufficient equity in the Property to pay Wadsworth's claim 
oflien after satisfying all senior lien claimants. See Tr. at 130: 12 - 131: 18. 
The mere fact that Wadsworth offers up its own interpretation of Idaho's Lien 
Bond Statute does not make the statute ambiguous. Stonebrook Constr., 277 P.3d at 378 
(" ... ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing interpretations to 
the court."). Rather, Wadsworth must offer an alternative reasonable interpretation. State v. 
Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). In determining whether Wadsworth's 
alternative interpretation is reasonable, this Court should consider the public policy behind the 
statute, its legislative history, the context in which the language is used, the evils to be remedied, 
and the objects in view. Id., Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist., 141 Idaho at 312, 109 P.3d at 166. 
Additionally, this Court has stated that statutory "interpretations that could lead to absurd or 
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored." Id. 
In this action, nobody disputes that Idaho's Lien Bond Statute allowed American 
Bank to bond around Wadsworth's claim oflien. R Vol. 11, p. 2740 (" ... American Bank, as a 
'party in interest in the premises subject to the lien' obtained a surety bond executed by 
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American Bank, and therefore complied with the requirements ofLC. § 45-519."). Rather, the 
parties dispute the legal effect of American Bank bonding around Wadsworth's junior lien. 
As asserted in the previous section, American Bank argues that the Lien Release 
Bond simply replaced the Property as the collateral securing Wadsworth's lien, entitling 
Wadsworth to recover from the Lien Release Bond every penny it would have recovered by 
foreclosing its lien against the Property. American Bank's interpretation is consistent with the 
legislative history of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute and the Idaho title industry's customs and 
practices. Minutes, House State Affairs Committee, Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305)4 ("It allows 
someone who is grieved by a lien to post a bond and bond around the lien" and "the lien creditor 
is adequately protected by putting the bond as security instead of a lien on the [property]."); 
Affidavit of Jeffrey Bo Davies ("Davies Aff."), R Vol. 11, pp. 2784-87, ~~ 5-8 ("In the case of a 
bond to release a mechanic's lien, it was commonly understood in Idaho's title industry that the 
bonding company was only obligating itselfto pay that amount that the lien claimant could 
recover through a foreclosure of its lien against the property. Thus, the bond was simply 
replacing the property as the security for the mechanic's lien, but reserving all defenses to attack 
the lien, including a defense that there is not sufficient equity in the property to pay a 
subordinated lien."). 
American Bank's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute comports with 
common sense as it allows the affected parties to preserve their legal rights, while at the same 
4 The published legislative history ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute is attached to this Brief 
as Addendum C. 
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time expediting the process of obtaining marketable title and preventing waste to the property 
during the pendency ofthe litigation between the competing lien claimants. Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d 
at 462, 763 P.2d at 1330 ("The purpose of the release bond procedure is to provide a means by 
which, before a final determination of the lien claimant's rights and without prejudice to those 
rights, the property may be freed ofthe lien, so that it may be sold, developed, or used as security 
for the loan."). 
The wisdom of the legislative purpose is readily apparent. A 
mechanic's lien on a building in the course of construction, unless 
promptly removed, can entail loss of credit, work stoppage, and 
financial collapse. The time element may make imperative the use 
of the deposit method of discharge to avert disaster. The remedy 
of deposit, therefore, may quite properly be used as a stopgap 
pending the employment of a more leisurely remedy under any of 
the appropriate provisions of Section 19. 
Application ofTumac Realty Corp., 203 Misc. 649,652, 123 N.Y.S.2d 642,645 (1952). 
Wadsworth argues that Idaho's Lien Bond Statute made American Bank and the 
bond surety a guarantor of Wadsworth's claim of lien, regardless of whether Wadsworth would 
have recovered anything had Wadsworth's lien remained attached to the Property. The district 
court accepted Wadsworth's interpretation largely based upon the district court's ipse dixit 
conclusion that Wadsworth's claim oflien against the Property was more valuable than the 
security provided by the Lien Release Bond. See COP at 1 10. 
Wadsworth's and the district court's interpretation of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute is 
inconsistent with Idaho's rules of statutory construction. First, the district court's conclusion that 
a lien against real estate is more valuable than the security provided by a lien bond is contrary to 
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the Idaho Lien Bond Statute legislative history. See Minutes, House State Affairs Committee, 
Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305) ("the lien creditor is adequately protected by putting the bond as security 
instead of a lien on the [property]."). Second, accepting this alternative interpretation leads to an 
absurd and unreasonably harsh result because it makes American Bank liable for a mechanic's 
lien that would have been foreclosed out by American Bank's Mortgage had it remained attached 
to the Property. See COP at ~~ 15-18. 
Giving Wadsworth a $2.4 million windfall recovery and imposing a 
corresponding liability upon American Bank simply because American Bank posted the Lien 
Release Bond is also inconsistent with numerous reported decisions interpreting similar lien 
bond statutes. These decisions uniformly hold that a lien claimant should not be given additional 
rights simply because a lien bond is substituted as the collateral for the property. Camputaro v. 
Stuart Hardwood Corp., 180 Conn. 545,549,429 A.2d 796, 798 (1980) ("Obviously, the 
plaintiff's rights on the bond can rise no higher than those acquired under the underlying 
mechanic's lien for which the bond is merely a substitute."); North v. WajJle House, Inc., 177 
Ga. App. 162, 163,338 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1985) ("The lien release bond ... serves as a 
replacement for the lien to which it refers, and does not authorize a new and different procedure 
limited to the bond or result in additional rights."); Royster Constr. Co. v. Urban W Cmty., 40 
Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1166,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 688-89 (1995) (quoting Ohio Plate Glass Co. v. 
Paskin,4 Ohio Misc. 136,209 N.E.2d 640, 642 (1965)) (" ... an action against a release bond 
surety 'does not change the cause of action [to foreclose the mechanic's lien] in any way' ."). 
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In no uncertain terms, if the district court's interpretation stands, the provisions of 
Idaho's Lien Bond Statute that allow one lienholder to bond around another lienholder will 
become meaningless as no senior lienholder will ever bond around a junior lienholder ifby doing 
so it waives its priority defense. Six Carpenters, Inc. v. Beach Carpenters Corp., 172 Conn. 1, 7, 
372 A.2d 123, 127 (1976) ("The construction urged by the defendant would discourage the 
substitution of bonds by agreement because of fear of waiving defenses to the underlying lien."); 
Davies Aff., R Vol. 11, pp. 2786-87, , 8 ("In sum, the Court's order mooting the priority issue 
because of the posting of the lien bond will disrupt a long standing practice in the Idaho real 
estate industry, wherein senior lienholders often use Idaho's Lien Bond Statute as a mechanism 
for bonding around a junior lienholder and thereby preserving the maximum value of the real 
estate collateralizing the senior lien, while at the same time preserving the junior lienholder's 
security by providing an adequate alternative source of collateral should there be sufficient 
equity in the property to satisfy both the senior lienholder and the junior lienholder."). 
In sum, even ifIdaho's Lien Bond Statute is ambiguous, American Bank offers a 
more reasonable interpretation: namely, Wadsworth should be entitled to recover the same 
amount from the lien bond that it would have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the 
Property, resulting in no prejudice to Wadsworth and allowing American Bank to mitigate its 
losses by expediting the marketability ofthe collateral securing its loan to BRN. 
25 Client2396663.1 
2. Any order releasing a mechanic's lien upon the posting of a lien bond 
does not remove the lien for all purposes, but rather the bond replaces 
the property as the collateral securing the mechanic's lien. 
The district court's February 2,2011, order mooting the lien priority issue was 
primarily based upon the district court's erroneous belief that its prior April 27, 2010, order, 
which order was entered upon stipulation of American Bank and Wadsworth, released 
Wadsworth's lien "in its entirety and for all purposes" and as a result "[i]t is difficult to 
prioritize a lien that no longer exists of record." R Vol. 11, p. 2740 (emphasis in original). By 
concluding that its order entered on April 27, 2010, released Wadsworth's mechanic's lien for all 
purposes, the district court again failed to give effect to the entirety of Idaho's Lien Bond Statute. 
Upon the posting of American Bank's lien bond and proof of payment ofthe 
premium, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute required the district court to enter an order that recited "that 
the lien is released of record for all purposes to the same extent as if released of record by the 
lienor." See IDAHO CODE § 45-521(2). Further, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute recites that "[u]pon 
entry of the order, the lien is released of record in its entirety and for all purposes and the real 
property, the subject ofthe lien, is released from the encumbrances of the lien." See IDAHO 
CODE § 45-512(3). 
But other provisions ofIdaho's Lien Bond Statute reflect that the lien is not 
released for all purposes, but rather just released against the property and then attached to the 
lien bond as an adequate alternative form of security. See IDAHO CODE §§ 45-519 and 
45-522(1). The stipulated order entered by the Court on April 27, 2010, recites likewise, "the 
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bond filed herein shall be subject to the claims that would otherwise constitute liens against the 
above-described property." See COP at,-r 5. 
Additionally, the legislative history for Idaho's Lien Bond Statute provides that 
the lien is not released for all purposes but rather simply changes the collateral to which the lien 
attaches. See Minutes, House State Affairs Committee, Feb. 16, 1993 (HB 305) ("the lien 
creditor is adequately protected by putting the bond as security instead of a lien on the 
[property]. "). 
Again, no Idaho appellate court has interpreted Idaho's Lien Bond Statute. 
However, numerous other jurisdictions have concluded that a lien bond simply replaces the 
property as the collateral securing the mechanic's lien and, as such, does not extinguish the 
mechanic's lien for all purposes as the district court erroneously concluded in this matter. 
DBM also argues that it would have been impossible to foreclose 
on the lien once the bond had released it from the property because 
there was no longer any lien to foreclose upon, but his argument is 
simply incorrect A lien bond does not eliminate a lien entirely. A 
lien bond releases the property from the lien, but the lien is then 
secured by the bond. 
DBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wash. App. 35, 41-42,170 
P.3d 592, 596 (2007). 
The surety bond will not extinguish API's lien or affect its priority. 
It will only substitute the bond for the land as the object to which 
the lien attaches. 
TO. IXv. Super. Ct. a/Ventura County, 165 Cal. App. 4th 140, 148,80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 608 
(2008). 
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The release bond procedure thus protects the lien claimant by 
providing an alternate source of recovery on the claim of lien. The 
release bond procedure "does not deprive the [lien claimant] of its 
constitutional right to a lien" but "[o]n the contrary, it provides for 
the speedy and efficient enforcement of such lien .... " 
Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d at 463, 763 P.2d at 1330 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
If a lien release bond is properly obtained and recorded under 
OCGA Section 44-14-264, "the bond stands in the place of the real 
property as security for the lien claimant." 
Cent. Atlanta Tractor Sales, Inc. v. Athena Dev., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 355, 356, 657 S.E.2d 290, 
292 (2008) (citation omitted). 
Obviously, the plaintiff's rights on the bond can rise no higher than 
those acquired under the underlying mechanic's lien for which the 
bond is merely a substitute. 
Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corp., 180 Conn. 545,549,429 A.2d 796, 798 (1980). 
Once Kane posted the bond, NuScope's security for the claim 
underlying its mechanic's lien became the bond ... and not the 
real estate. 
Kane, 243 Va. at 509,416 S.E.2d at 705. 
3. The district court erroneously concluded that Virginia's lien bond 
statute is distinguishable from Idaho's Lien Bond Statute. 
York Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Hazel, Inc., 256 Va. 598, 506 S.E.2d 315 
(1998), is procedurally and factually nearly identical to the matter at hand. In York, a lender 
bonded around a mechanic's lien after the contractor filed an action to foreclose its mechanic's 
lien. After the lender and contractor stipulated to the validity and amount of the contractor's 
lien, the contractor moved for summary judgment, therein seeking an order that allowed the 
contractor to collect the stipulated amount from the lien bond. The lender contested the 
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contractor's motion for summary judgment, arguing that Virginia's lien bond statute limited the 
contractor's recovery to that amount it would have collected from the property. The district 
court rejected the lender's argument and granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment, 
ruling that the contractor could collect the stipulated amount from the lien bond without having 
to prove that its mechanic's lien was prior to the lender's deed of trust. 
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the matter 
for factual findings regarding the amount the contractor would have recovered by foreclosing its 
lien against the property after considering the priority between the contractor's claim oflien and 
the lender's deed of trust. [d. at 602, 506 S.E.2d at 317. 
In this action, the district court distinguished York on the basis that: 
The two statutes that the York court analyzed and applied to the 
facts of that case, Virginia Code §§ 43-21 and 43-70, are 
sufficiently different than I.e. § 45-518, et seq. Notably absent 
from the Virginia statutes is any mention of the lien being released 
of record in its entirety and for all purposes. 
R Vol. 11, pp. 2740-41. However, upon close comparison, Idaho's Lien Bond Statute and 
Virginia's lien bond statute both limit a claimant's recovery on the lien bond to the amount they 
would have recovered by foreclosing their mechanic's lien against the property. 
More specifically, Virginia's lien bond statute recites that " ... [a] part[y] in 
interest may ... apply to the court in which such suit shall be pending ... for permission to file a 
bond in the penalty of double the amount of such lien ... and costs ... conditioned for the 
payment of such judgment adjUdicating the lien ... to be valid and determining the amount for 
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which the same would have been enforceable against the real estate as may be rendered by the 
court upon the hearing of the case on its merits .... " See VA. CODE § 43-70. 
Idaho's Lien Bond Statute similarly limits American Bank's and the bond surety's 
liability to "such amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been secured 
by [Wadsworth's] lien, with interest, costs and attorney's fees." See IDAHO CODE § 45-519. 
Simply put, there is no meaningful difference between the past tense phrase "the 
amount for which the same would have been enforceable against the real estate as may be 
rendered by the court" used in Virginia Code Section 43-70 and the past tense phrase "such 
amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been secured by his lien" as 
used in Idaho Code Section 45-519. Both phrases refer to the prior security interest in the 
property, and both limit recovery on the lien bond to the amount that the lien claimant would 
have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the property. 
4. The legal citations adopted by the district court do not support the 
district court's holding that the issue of lien priority was waived or 
mooted as a result of American Bank posting the lien bond. 
The district court did not cite any case that held a lien priority is waived or 
mooted by the posting of a lien bond. Rather, the district court simply stated that 
" ... Wadsworth provides that there is no Idaho case law on this matter and cites this Court to 
numerous non-Idaho authority for the proposition that the only remaining issues remaining post-
bond are validity and the amount ofthe lien." R Vol. 11, pp. 2737-38. Then the district court 
cited Corpus Juris Secundum for the proposition that "[t]he giving of a bond to discharge 
property from a mechanic's lien is not an acknowledgement of the validity of the lien, and does 
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not change the lien claimant's burden to prove he or she is entitled to payment under the 
mechanic's lien law. In connection the owner [debtor, principal and/or surety] may still contest 
the lien's existence, amount, and validity." !d., p. 2741 (quoting 56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens 
§ 299 (2010)). Additionally, the district court cited to a Washington Court of Appeals decision 
for the proposition that "a lien bond in lieu of a mechanic's lien does not eliminate a lien 
entirely; rather, a lien bond releases the property from the lien, but the lien is then secured by the 
bond. Further, a judgment adjudicating the validity ofthe lien is required to foreclose on the 
lien." !d. (citingDBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Wash. 
App. 35, 170 P.3d 592 (2007)). 
Neither the DBM Consulting decision nor the CJS citation support the district 
court's ultimate holding that the issue oflien priority was mooted by American Bank: posting the 
lien bond. Rather, those citations support American Bank's argument that the posting of the lien 
bond did nothing other than to change the form ofthe collateral securing Wadsworth's lien, from 
the Property to the lien bond, thus requiring Wadsworth to prove its lien foreclosure action in the 
same manner as it would have done by foreclosing its lien against the Property. For example, in 
DBM Consulting Engineers, Inc., the Washington Court of Appeals held that the contractor 
could not collect from the lien bond until it obtained a judgment foreclosing its claim oflien. 
DBM Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 142 Wash. App. 35,41-42, 170 P.3d 592, 596 (Ct. App. 2007). 
While the applicable foreclosure process depends on whether the 
lien is secured by property (which can then be sold) or by a bond, 
in either situation, the lien must be foreclosed upon before the 
lienholder is entitled to recover on the lien. Mountain Ranch 
[Corp. v. Amalgam Enters., Inc.], 143 P.3d [1065,] 1068-69 
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Id. 
[(Colo. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 2864900, 2006 
Colo. LEXIS 834 (Colo. Oct. 10,2006)]. So in order to be entitled 
to payment on the bond, DBM needed to foreclose its lien. 
Because DBM did not obtain a judgment foreclosing its lien, 
Travelers is not obligated to pay on the lien bond. 
The Washington Court of Appeals' adoption of the holdings of Hutnick and 
Mountain Ranch is also instructive because in both ofthose cases the California Supreme Court 
and the Colorado Court of Appeals held respectively that "[b ]ecause recovery on the bond is part 
of the process for enforcing the mechanic's lien, authorities from other jurisdictions have 
concluded that a cause of action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is substantially the same whether 
relief is sought against the liened property or against a bond which has been substituted for the 
property." Hutnick, 47 Cal. 3d at 463, 763 P.2d at 1330, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40; Mountain 
Ranch Corp. v. Amalgam Enters., Inc., 143 P.3d 1065, 1068 (Colo. App. 2005). 
But in this action the district court concluded that Wadsworth's claim to foreclose 
its mechanic's lien against the Lien Release Bond is not substantially the same as an action to 
foreclose its mechanic's lien against the Property, as the district court concluded that the issue of 
priority is relevant in the latter action but not the former. R Vol. 11, p. 2737 ("Wadsworth 
argues that American Bank had two choices. It could have chosen to litigate lien priority in the 
foreclosure action, or American Bank could have obtained a lien release bond thereby releasing 
Wadsworth's lien on the Project. American Bank chose to undertake the lat[t]er option, which 
makes lien priority no longer an issue between American Bank and Wadsworth."). 
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The CJS citation likewise does not state that lien priority is mooted by the posting 
of a lien bond. Rather, it simply attempts to summarize various cases addressing the legal 
significance of the posting of a lien bond. And while the CJS citation notes that "it has also been 
held that a mechanics' lien claimant whose lien has been discharged by a bond may ... bring an 
action in equity against the debtor and the surety on the bond and obtain therein a judgment 
establishing the validity and amount of the lien and a personal judgment against the judgment 
debtor and the surety on the bond," it also noted that "[t]here is authority that a surety is not 
liable to a subcontractor on the surety's mechanic's lien substitution bond where the 
subcontractor has not pursued the in rem remedy of foreclosure on the bond for which the surety 
agreed to act as surety .... " See 56 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 304 (2010) (citing the Colorado 
Court of Appeals decision in Mountain Ranch for the latter proposition). 
In sum, even the legal authorities cited by the district court support American 
Bank's argument that Wadsworth's recovery on the lien bond should be limited to the amount it 
would have recovered by foreclosing its lien against the Property. 
B. Because Wadsworth Was Not Registered Under the ICRA at All Times It 
Performed Work on the Project, the District Court Erred in Allowing 
Wadsworth to Recover on Its Claim of Lien. 
The ICRA states that "[n]o person engaged in the business or acting in the 
capacity of a contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in any court 
of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for 
which registration is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly 
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registered contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this chapter, at all times 
during the performance of such act or contract." IDAHO CODE § 54-5217(2). 
The district court determined that Wadsworth was not exempt from the ICRA and 
that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor 
or supplied materials in constructing [the golf course]' as required by Idaho Code 
§ 54-5217(2) .... " R Vol. 13, p. 3225 (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding, the district 
court still allowed Wadsworth to recover on its claim oflien. !d., p. 3227. 
The question raised in this appeal is whether the district court erred by not 
enforcing the plain language ofIdaho Code Section 54-5217(2), which bars a contractor from 
bringing any action for unpaid compensation if it was not registered under the ICRA "at all times 
during the performance of such act or contract." See IDAHO CODE § 54-5217(2). American 
Bank asserts that the district court erred for the following reasons. 
First, the district court erred by engaging in rules of statutory construction. The 
district court did so in reliance of Judge Tingey's opinion in MWSH Idaho Falls, LLC v. Lupton, 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-09-224, that the penalty provisions of the ICRA are ambiguous. 
R Vol. 13, pp. 3225-27. Subsequent to the district court's ruling, this Court held in Stonebrook 
Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, that the penalty provisions of the ICRA are 
unambiguous. 
When the Legislature enacted the ICRA, it took the extraordinary 
step of expressly stripping the economic protections typically 
extended to contractors. First, the Act's penalty section prohibits 
unregistered contractors from bringing or maintaining "any action 
in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for" 
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any contracting work done. I.C. § 54-5217(2). Second, the Act 
contains a separate provision expressly denying umegistered 
contractors the right to place a lien. I.C. § 54-5208. The Act 
contains no language limiting the circumstances under which these 
penalties apply. In view of the unambiguous language specifying 
the significant penalties imposed upon umegistered contractors, the 
issue to be resolved is not whether Chase is entitled to invoke the 
Act for its benefit, but whether Stonebrook complied with the 
Act's registration requirements. 
Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 277 P.3d 374, 377-78 (Idaho 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
Because this Court has found the penalty provision of Section 54-5217(2) to be 
unambiguous, the district court erred by applying the rules of statutory construction rather than 
enforcing the penalty provisions ofldaho Code Section 54-5217(2) according to the plain, usual 
and ordinary meaning of the words used in that statute. Stonebrook, 277 P.3d 374 at 378 
(quoting Curlee v. Kootenai County. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458,465 
(2008» ("Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction."). 
More specifically, because the district court determined as a factual and legal 
matter that "Wadsworth was not registered 'at all times during the period that it furnished work 
or labor or supplied materials in constructing [the golf course]' as required by Idaho Code 
§ 54-5217(2) ... ," (R Vol. 13, p. 3225 (emphasis in original», the district court should have 
ended the analysis and dismissed Wadsworth's counterclaim, as the other language ofldaho 
Code Section 54-5217(2) mandates that: "[n]o person ... may bring or maintain any action in 
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any court in this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or 
contract for which registration is required by this chapter .... " 
Second, the district court erroneously relied upon this Court's decision in 
ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010). The district court cited 
ParkWest for the proposition that a contractor can recover for work performed during periods of 
time the contractor was registered under the ICRA, even though it performed work on the same 
project during other periods when it was not registered. R. Vol. 13, pp. 3224-25. 
In Park West, this Court addressed whether a contractor's lien was invalidated 
because of its failure to register at the time it entered into a contract to build a residential home. 
Ultimately this Court determined that the critical question was not whether the contractor was 
registered at the time it entered into the contract, but rather whether "ParkWest was registered 
under the Contractor Act at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied 
materials in constructing Bamson's house." ParkWest, 149 Idaho at 609,238 P.3d at 209. 
Because "the uncontroverted evidence was that Park West was registered under the Contractor 
Act at all times during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in 
constructing Bamson's house," the Idaho Supreme Court held that ParkWest's lien was valid and 
enforceable. Id. 
Previously in the Park West decision, this Court stated that: 
... ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided and 
materials it supplied during the time that it was duly registered. To 
hold otherwise would mean that a contractor who violated the Act 
would be forever barred from obtaining a mechanic's lien. 
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Id. at 608,238 P.3d at 208. These comments are dicta because there was no evidence that the 
contractor in Park West was umegistered at any time that it furnished work or labor or supplied 
materials in constructing the residential home. Rather, the "uncontroverted evidence" in 
Park West established that the contractor "was registered under the Contractor Act at all times 
during the period that it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing Barnson's 
house." Id. at 609, 238 P.2d at 209. 
Because there was no finding in Park West that the contractor was umegistered at 
times it furnished work or labor or supplied materials in constructing the residential home, 
ParkWest is distinguishable from the matter at hand. Thus, the district court erred in relying on 
dicta statements in Park West for the proposition that a contractor can recover for its work 
performed during periods of time that it was registered under the ICRA, even though it was 
umegistered during other periods of time that it performed work on the same project. 
In sum, because the penalty provision of Section 54-5217(2) ofthe ICRA is 
unambiguous, the district court erred by not enforcing the Act according to the plain meaning of 
the words used in the statute. Applying the plain meaning of Section 54-5217(2), this Court 
should reverse the district court with instructions on remand to dismiss Wadsworth's 
counterclaim because of Wadsworth's failure to register under the ICRA "at all times during the 
performance of such act or contract." 
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C. Alternatively, Because Wadsworth Violated the IeRA by Engaging 
Unregistered Subcontractors, the District Court Erred in Allowing 
Wadsworth to Recover on Its Claim of Lien. 
Wadsworth used three subcontractors on the job that were not registered under the 
ICRA. See Statement of Facts, ~~ 9-11. Two of the subcontractors, Precision and Colorado 
Lining, never registered under the Act at any time they performed work on the Project. Id. at 
~~ 9 and 11. The third subcontractor, Concrete Finishing, performed work on the Project for 15 
days before it registered under the Act. Id. at ~ 10. The district court concluded that Wadsworth 
violated the ICRA by "failing to 'obtain satisfactory proof of Precision's, Colorado Lining's, 
and Concrete Finishing's registration under the Act." R Vol. 13, p. 3229. Notwithstanding that 
Wadsworth violated the Act, the district court did not invalidate Wadsworth's claim oflien in its 
entirety, but rather "reduce[d] the lien by the amount of unpaid invoices owing to the 
unregistered subcontractors." !d. 
The question raised on appeal is whether the district court erred by allowing 
Wadsworth to recover on its claim of lien even though it violated the ICRA by engaging 
unregistered subcontractors. American Bank asserts that the district court erred by failing to 
enforce the penalty provisions of the Act. 
In the Ada County case of Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc. v. Plainridge, Ada 
County Case No. CV-09-1225, District Judge Michael Wetherell addressed the same issue now 
before this Court, i.e., what is the penalty for a general contractor's use of an unregistered 
subcontractor. But unlike the district court's legal conclusion in this case, Judge Wetherell 
interpreted the penalty provisions of the ICRA (Idaho Code Sections 54-5208 and 54-5217) 
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consistent with the statement in Section 54-5204(2) that it is unlawful to engage unregistered 
contractors. In so doing, Judge Wetherell invalidated the general contractor's lien in that case in 
its entirety. 
Whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to the hiring of 
unregistered subcontractors is an issue of first impression. 
* * * 
As to the issue of whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to 
registered contractors that engage unregistered subcontractors, this 
Court finds that they do apply. The first sentence of Section 5208, 
if read in a vacuum, would apparently operate to deny lien rights 
only to unregistered contractors, and thus all registered contractors 
would have lien rights. However, that interpretation would render 
meaningless other parts of the statute. The most glaring is the first 
clause of the second sentence in the statute, which states that the 
statute will not operate to deny the rights of registered contractors 
operating at the direction of unregistered contractors. If the first 
sentence were to strictly apply only to unregistered contractors 
themselves, that clause would be utterly without meaning, as it 
only guarantees that lien rights will not be denied to a subset of 
registered contractors, which would not have their rights denied 
anyway. 
The second part of Chapter 52 that would be rendered virtually 
meaningless would be proscription of hiring unregistered 
contractors. Section 5204 specifically makes it unlawful to engage 
a subcontractor without receiving proof that the subcontractor was 
registered. Ifthere were no penalties applied for violating that 
provision, it would render "unlawful" virtually meaningless. This 
Court must apply the law in such a way as to give effect to all 
statutory provisions. If this Court were to decline to apply the 
penalty provision to registered contractors who hire unregistered 
contractors, it would render several provisions of this statute 
meaningless. Thus, this Court finds that penalties of Sections 5208 
and 5217 apply to registered contractors that engage unregistered 
contractors. 
* * * 
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Since the penalties of Chapter 52 apply to registered contractors 
that hire unregistered subcontractors, any lien claims arising while 
the unregistered subcontractor is employed are conclusively 
waived, and no action may be brought for collection of debts owed 
on the labor. Since there is no disagreement that Rancho was 
unregistered throughout all the work performed by Prowall on the 
Plainridge Place Condominiums, Prowall's lien claims and action 
to collect are barred. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc., dated Feb. 2, 2011, pp. 5-7, attached to this Brief as 
AddendumD. 
American Bank respectfully requests this Court to adopt the better-reasoned 
analysis of Judge Wetherell in the Prowall case and hold that Wadsworth's use of unregistered 
subcontractors violated the ICRA and as a consequence bars Wadsworth from bringing any 
action to foreclose its claim of lien, or any other collection action for that matter, as it relates to 
any unpaid work on the Project. For this separate alternative reason, this Court should remand 
the matter back to the district court with instructions to dismiss Wadsworth's counterclaim. 
D. The District Court's Award oCPrejudgment Interest, Attorney Fees and 
Costs Should Be Reversed. 
The district court awarded Wadsworth prejudgment interest, costs and attorney 
fees pursuant to various provisions of Idaho's mechanic's lien statute and Idaho's Lien Bond 
Statute. R Vol. 13, pp. 3340-41 (citing IDAHO CODE §§ 45-513 and 45-522). More specifically, 
the district court awarded prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees as an in rem award, 
meaning the district court allowed Wadsworth to increase the amount of its lien by the award of 
costs and attorney fees and collect the same from the Lien Release Bond posted by American 
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Banle Id. (quoting Elec. Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823-24, 41 P.3d 242, 
251-52 (2001)). 
For all of the arguments previously asserted, the district court erred by allowing 
Wadsworth to collect prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees from the Lien Release Bond. 
First, had Wadsworth foreclosed its claim oflien against the Property, Wadsworth's lien would 
have been foreclosed out by American Bank's prior mortgage lien and Wadsworth would have 
recovered none ofthe principal amount of its claim oflien, let alone any award of prejudgment 
interest, costs or attorney fees. 
Second, the district court should have invalidated Wadsworth's lien in its entirety 
because of Wadsworth's failure to register under the ICRA or, alternatively, because of 
Wadsworth's violation of the ICRA by engaging unregistered subcontractors. 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's order and 
judgment that allows Wadsworth to collect prejudgment interest of$371,368.82 and costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of$208,417.47 from the Lien Release Bond. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred by refusing to consider the priority of American Bank's 
Mortgage over Wadsworth's claim of lien when determining the amount that Wadsworth could 
collect from the Lien Release Bond. This matter should be remanded to the district court for a 
factual determination ofthe amount that Wadsworth's claim oflien was secured by the Property, 
after considering its subordination to American Bank's Mortgage, as that is the amount 
Wadsworth should recover from the Lien Release Bond. 
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Alternatively, because of Wadsworth's failure to maintain registration under the 
ICRA at all times it worked on the Project, or because of Wadsworth's additional violation of the 
ICRA by using unregistered subcontractors, this Court should invalidate Wadsworth's claim of 
lien in its entirety and remand the matter back to the district court with instructions to dismiss 
Wadsworth's counterclaim. 
Finally, the district court's award of prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees 
should be reversed because Wadsworth would not have recovered those sums had it foreclosed 
its lien against the Property, or alternatively Wadsworth's lien is invalid in its entirety because of 
Wadsworth's multiple violations of the ICRA. 
+L 
DATED this _10_ day of July, 2012. 
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MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By &f'-
C. Clayton Gill- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for American Bank 
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Addendum A to American 
Bank's Opening Brief 
Idaho's Lien Bond Statute 
Idaho Code Sections 45-518 
through 45-524 
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Statutes Page 1 of 1 
Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-518. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND 
MANNER. A mechanic 1 s lien of record upon real property may be released 
upon the posting of a surety bond in the manner provided in sections 45-
51~ through 45-524, Idaho Code. 
Hi.story: 
[45-518, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 3, p. 1388.] 
The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public 
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in 
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's 
copyright. 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstatITitle451T45CH5SECT4 5-518PrinterFriendly .htm 7/3/2012 
Statutes Page 1 of2 
Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-519. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND - - FORM 
OF BOND. The debtor of the lien claimant or a party in interest in the 
premises subject to the lien must obtain a surety bond executed by the 
debtor of the lien claimant or a party in interest in the premises subject 
to the lien, as principal, and executed by a corporation authorized to 
transact surety business in this state, as surety, in substantially the 
following form: 
(Title of court and cause, if action has been commenced) 
WHEREAS, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (name of owner, contractor, or other 
person disputing the lien) desires to give a bond for releasing the 
following described real property from that certain claim of mechanic's 
1 ien in the sum of $ ........... , recorded ............... , .... , in the 
of fice of the recorder in ....................... (name of county where 
the real property is situated): 
(legal description) 
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned principal and surety do hereby 
obligate themselves to ......................... , (name of claimant) the 
claimant named in the mechanic's lien, under the conditions prescribed by 
sections ~518 through 45-524, Idaho Code, inclusive, in the sum of 
$ ....... (1-1/2 x claim), from which sum they will pay the claimant such 
amount as a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudge to have been 
secured by his lien, with interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the principal and surety have executed this bond 
at ................... , Idaho, on the ......... day of ............ , 
State of Idaho 
) ss. 
County of ........ ) 
BY 
(Signature of Principal) 
(SURETY CORPORATION) 
(Its Attorney in Fact) 
On ............... , .... , before me, the undersigned, a notary public 
of this county and state, personally appeared ....................... who 
acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instrument as principal for 
the purposes therein mentioned and also personally 
appeared ....................... known (or satisfactorily proved) to me to 
be the attorney in fact of the corporation that executed the foregoing 
instrument and known to me to be the person who executed that instrument 
on behalf of the corporation therein named, and he acknowledged to me that 
that corporation executed the foregoing instrument. 
(Notary Public in and for the 
County and State) 
http://legislaturejdaho.govlidstatITitle451T45CH5SECT4 5-519PrinterFriendly .htm 7/3/2012 
Statutes Page 2 of2 
History: 
[45-519, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 4, p. 1388; am. 2002, ch. 32, sec. 
18, p. 56.] 
The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public 
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in 
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's 
copyright. 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstatiTitle4SIT4SCHSSECT4S-S19PrinterFriendly .htm 7/3/2012 
Statutes Page 1 of 1 
Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-520. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND 
PETITION FOR RELEASE -- SERVICE OF COPY OF PETITION. (1) A petition for 
the release of a mechanic's lien by posting a surety bond must be filed in 
the district court of the county wherein the property is located and shall 
set forth: 
(a) The title of the cause, thus: "In the matter of the petition 
of ......................... (name of petitioner) for release of 
mechanic's lien of ......................... (name of mechanic's lien 
claimant) upon posting surety bond." 
(b) An allegation of the purchase of and payment of the premium for 
the bond, and the dates of purchase and payment. 
(c) An allegation incorporating by reference a true copy of the bond, 
which copy must be attached to the petition. 
(d) The name or names of the owner or reputed owners of the land 
subject to the lien. 
(e) A description of the real property subject to the lien, and the 
instrument number of the lien as given by the recorder's office. 
(f) A prayer for an order releasing the lien. 
(2) The petitioner shall obtain an order from the district court 
setting forth the time and date of the hearing on the petition" which time 
and date must be at least five (5) days after the date of the order and 
not more than ten (10) days after the date of the order. 
(3) A copy of the petition and a copy of the order must be served on 
the lien claimant at least two (2) days before the date set for the 
hearing and served in the manner provided by law for service of summons. 
History: 
[45-520, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 5, p. 1389.J 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-521. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND 
HEARING ON PETITION - - CONTENTS AND EFFECT OF ORDER RELEASING LIEN. (1) 
Upon the hearing, the court shall enter its order releasing the mechanic's 
lien upon the petitioner's filing in open court the original bond, and 
introducing into evidence a receipt for payment of the premium. 
(2) The entry of the order by the court must refer to the property 
which is the subj ect of the lien and the lien itself, by instrument 
number, and must recite that the lien is released of record for all 
purposes to the same extent as if released of record by the lienor. 
(3) Upon entry of the order, the lien is released of record in its 
entirety and for all purposes and the real property, the subject of the 
lien, is released from the encumbrances of the lien. 
(4) There is no appeal from the entry of an order pursuant to the 
provisions of this section and upon entry the order is final for all 
purposes. 
History: 
[45-521, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 6, p. 1390.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-522. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND -- ACTION 
AGAINST DEBTOR AND SURETY -- PREFERENTIAL SETTINGS. (1) The lien claimant 
is entitled to bring an action against the lien claimant's debtor and to 
join therein the surety on the bond. The rights of the lien claimant 
include and the court may award to him in that action: 
(a) The amount found due to the lien claimant by the court; 
(b) The cost of preparing and filing the lien claim, including 
attorney's fees, if any; 
(c) The costs of the proceedings; 
(d) Attorney's fees for representation of the lien claimant in the 
proceedings; and 
(e) Interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum on the 
amount found due to the lien claimant and from the date found by the 
court that the sum was due and payable. 
(2) Proceedings under subsection (1) of this section are entitled to 
priority of hearing second only to criminal hearings. The plaintiff in the 
action may serve upon the adverse party a "demand for thirty (30) day 
setting" in the proper form, and file the demand with the clerk of the 
court. Upon filing, the clerk of the court shall, before Friday next, 
vacate a case or cases as necessary and set the lien claimant's case for 
hearing, on a day or days certain, to be heard within thirty (30) days of 
the filing of the "demand for thirty (30) day setting." Only one (1) such 
preferential setting need be given by the court, unless the hearing date 
is vacated without stipulation of counsel for the plaintiff in writing. If 
the hearing date is vacated without that stipulation, upon service and 
filing of a "demand for thirty (30) day setting," a new preferential 
setting must be given. 
History: 
[45-522, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 7, p. 1390.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-523. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND -- MOTION 
TO ENFORCE LIABILITY OF SURETY. (1) By entering into a bond given pursuant 
to section~'2-519, Idaho Code, the surety submits himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court in which the bond is filed in the proceeding for 
release of the lien, and the surety irrevocably appoints the clerk of that 
court as its agent upon whom any papers affecting its liability on the 
bond may be served. Its liability may be enforced on motion without the 
necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of motion 
as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall 
forthwith mail copies to the surety if his address is known. 
(2) The motion described in subsection (1) of this section must not 
be instituted until the lapse of thirty (30) days following the giving of 
notice of entry of judgment in the action against the lien claimant I s 
debtor, if no notice of appeal from the judgment is filed, nor may the 
motion be instituted until the lapse of thirty (30) days following the 
filing of the remittitur from the court of appeals or the supreme court, 
if an appeal has been taken from the judgment. 
History: 
[45-523, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 8, p. 1391.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 45 
LIENS, MORTGAGES AND PLEDGES 
CHAPTER 5 
LIENS OF MECHANICS AND MATERIALMEN 
45-524. RELEASE OF LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY BY POSTING SURETY BOND 
EXCEPTION TO SUFFICIENCY OF SURETY. (1) The lien claimant may, within two 
(2) days after the service of a copy of the petition for release of the 
lien with a copy of the bond attached thereto pursuant to section 45-5_~~O~, 
Idaho Code, file with the clerk of the court in the action a notice 
excepting to the sufficiency of the surety on the bond, and shall, at the 
same time and together with that notice, file an affidavit setting forth 
the grounds and basis of the exceptions to the surety, and shall serve a. 
copy of the notice and a copy of the affidavit upon the attorney or the 
petitioner on the same date as the date of filing of the notice and 
affidavit. A hearing must be had upon the justification of the surety at 
the same time as that set for the hearing on the petition for an order to 
release the lien. 
(2) If the lien claimant fails to file and serve the notice and 
affidavit within two (2) days after the service of the petition for 
release of the lien, he shall be deemed to have waived all objection to 
the justification and sufficiency of the surety. 
History: 
[45-524, added 1993, ch. 378, sec. 9, p. 1391.] 
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Statutes Page 1 of 1 
Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5201. SHORT TITLE. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 
II Idaho Contractor Registration Act." 
History: 
[54-5201, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 471.) 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5202. DECLARATION OF POLICY. The legislature finds and declares that 
the practice of construction in the state of Idaho affects the public 
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The legislature further finds 
that it is in the public interest to provide a mechanism to remove from 
practice incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled practitioners of 
construction. To aid in fulfilling these purposes, this chapter provides 
for the registration of construction contractors within the state of 
Idaho. 
History: 
[54-5202, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 471.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5203. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Idaho contractors board as created in section 
54-5206, Idaho Code. 
(2) "Bureau chief" means the chief of the bureau of occupational 
licenses. 
(3) "Construction" means the performance of building, altering, 
repairing, adding to, subtracting from, improving, reconstructing, moving, 
excavating, wrecking or demolishing any building, highway, road, bridge, 
or other structure, project, development or improvement to real property, 
or to do any part thereof, including the erection of scaffolding or other 
structures or works in connection therewith. 
(4) "Contractor" means: 
(a) Any person who in any capacity undertakes, offers to undertake, 
purports to have the capacity to undertake, or submits a bid to, or 
does himself or by or through others, perform construction; or 
(b) A construction manager who performs construction management 
services. 
(5) "Department" means the department of self -governing agencies of 
the state of Idaho. 
(6) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, limited 
liability company, limited liability partnership, corporation, trust, 
association or other entity or organization capable of conducting 
business, or any combination thereof acting as a unit. 
History: 
[54-5203, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 471.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5204. REGISTRATION REQUIRED. (1) On and after January 1, 2006, it 
shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of, or hold 
himself out as, a contractor within this state without being registered as 
required in this chapter. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for a contractor to engage any other 
contractor who is required by this chapter to be registered as a 
contractor unless such other contractor furnishes satisfactory proof to 
the contractor that he is duly registered under the provisions of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any person who engages in the business or acts in the capacity of 
a contractor, whether or not duly registered, has thereby submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the state of Idaho and to the administrative jurisdiction 
of the Idaho contractors board, and shall be subject to all penalties and 
remedies available under Idaho law for any violation of this chapter. 
History: 
[54-5204, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 472.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5205. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION. (1) Nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to restrict any person licensed, registered, or otherwise 
regulated by the state of Idaho from engaging in the profession or 
practice for which they are licensed, registered or otherwise regulated by 
the state of Idaho including, but not limited to, persons licensed 
pursuant to chapters 3, 10, 12, 19, 26, 45 and 50, title 54, Idaho Code, 
nor shall this chapter require such persons otherwise licensed, registered 
or regulated to obtain such registration as required by this chapter, so 
long as such person is not acting with the intent to evade this chapter. 
No such person exempt hereunder may hold himself out as a registered 
contractor. 
(2) In addition to the exemption set forth in subsection (1) of this 
section, registration as provided for in this chapter shall not be 
required for the following, so long as such person is not acting with the 
intent to evade this chapter and so long as such person does not hold 
himself out as a registered contractor: 
(a) A person who only performs labor or . services for wages or a 
salary as an employee of a contractor, or as an employee of a person 
otherwise exempt by the provisions set forth in this chapter, or 
strictly as a volunteer or as part of a bona fide educational 
curriculum or nonprofit charitable activity for which no wages or 
salary shall be paid; provided however, that such exemption shall not 
apply to any subcontractor or other independent contractor who is not 
otherwise exempt; 
(b) An authorized representative of the United States government, the 
state of Idaho, or any incorporated municipality, county, alternative 
form of local government, highway district, reclamation district, or 
other municipal or political corporation or subdivision of this state; 
(c) A public utility operating under the regulation of the Idaho 
public utility commission as set forth in t~tl~l, Idaho Code, in the 
construction, maintenance, or development work incidental to its own 
business; 
(d) A person who performs repair or operation incidental to the 
discovery or production of oil, gas or minerals or incidental to the 
drilling, testing, abandoning, or other operation of an oil or gas 
well or a surface or underground mine or mineral deposit; 
(e) A person who only furnishes materials, supplies or equipment 
without that person installing or fabricating them into or consuming 
them in the performance of the work of the construction contractor; 
(f) A person performing work on one (1) undertaking or project 
cons idered casual, minor, or inconsequent ial, whether by one (1) or 
more contracts, the aggregate contract price of which, for labor and 
materials and all other items, is less than two thousand dollars 
($2,000). The exemptions prescribed in this paragraph (f) shall not 
apply when the work or construction is part of a larger construction 
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project, whether undertaken by the same or a different construction 
contractor, or in which a division of the operation is made into 
contracts of amounts of less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for 
the purpose of evasion of this chapter or otherwise; 
(g) A farmer or rancher while engaged in a farming, dairying, 
agriculture, viticulture, horticulture, or stock or poultry operation; 
(h) A person who engages in the construction of an agriculture 
building which is exempt from the Idaho building code act as set forth 
in section 39-4116, Idaho Code; 
(i) An irrigation district, canal company, reservoir district, ground 
water district, water district, water measurement district, recharge 
district, flood control district, drainage district, or other water 
delivery or water management entity, or an operating agent of 
irrigation districts whose board consists of directors of its member 
districts; 
(j) An operation related to clearing or other work upon land in rural 
districts for fire prevention purposes; 
(k) An owner who contracts for work to be performed by a registered 
contractor on his own property, provided however, this exemption shall 
not apply to an owner who, with the intent to evade this chapter, 
constructs abuilding, residence or other improvement on the owner's 
property with the intention and for the purpose of selling the 
improved property at any time during the construction or within twelve 
(12) months of completion of such construction; 
(1) An owner performing construction on the owner's personal 
residential real property, whether or not occupied by the owner, 
provided however, this exemption shall not apply to an owner who is 
otherwise regulated by this chapter who constructs a building, 
residence or other improvement on the owner's property with the 
intention and for the purpose of promptly selling the improved 
property, unless the owner has continuously occupied the property as 
the owner's primary residence for not less than twelve (12) months 
prior to the sale of such property; 
(m) Owners of commercial properties, or lessees of commercial 
properties with the consent of the owner, who, whether themselves or 
with their own employees, perform maintenance, repair, alteration or 
construction work in or upon the properties; 
(n) A real estate licensee acting within the scope of his license 
pursuant to chapter 20, title 54, Idaho Code, who, incident to a 
regulated real estate transaction, assists his clients in scheduling 
or performing nominal maintenance and repairs upon such properties 
being transferred; provided however, nothing in this section shall 
otherwise authorize a real estate licensee or a property manager to 
act in the capacity of a contractor unless registered with the board; 
(0) A contractor engaged in the logging industry who builds forest 
access roads for the purpose of harvesting and transporting logs from 
forest to mill; 
(p) A person working on the person's own residence, if the residence 
is owned by a person other than the resident; 
(q) A person who engages in the construction of buildings to be used 
primarily for industrial chemical process purposes as set forth in 
section 39-4103, Idaho Code; or 
(r) A person who engages in the construction of a modular building as 
defined in section 39-4301, Idaho Code, that is constructed in the 
state of Idaho for installation on a building site outside the state. 
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History: 
[54-5205, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 472; am. 2007, ch. 252, sec. 
1-3, p. 748.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5206. IDAHO CONTRACTORS BOARD. (1) The Idaho contractors board is 
hereby created and made a part of the bureau of occupational licenses. It 
shall be the responsibility and duty of the bureau chief to administer 
this chapter, and the bureau chief shall exercise such powers and duties 
as are reasonably necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter. The 
board may promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter in order to effectuate the purposes herein and 
for the orderly and efficient administration thereof, except as may be 
limited or prohibited by law and the provisions of this chapter. 
(2) The board shall consist of four (4) members who are contractors, 
and one (1) member of the public at large, all of whom shall be appointed 
by the governor as follows: one (1) contractor from the northern district 
consisting of Idaho, Lewis, Nez Perce, Clearwater, Latah, Benewah, 
Boundary, Shoshone, Kootenai and Bonner counties; one (1) contractor from 
the southeastern district consisting of Lemhi, Butte, Clark, Fremont, 
Jefferson, Madison, Teton, Bonneville, Bingham, Caribou, Bear Lake, 
Franklin, Oneida, Power and Bannock counties; one (1) contractor from the 
southwestern district consisting of Owyhee, Elmore, Ada, Canyon, Boise, 
Gem, Payette, Washington, Adams and Valley counties; one (1) contractor 
from the south central district consisting of Blaine, Camas, Cassia, 
Custer, Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln, Minidoka and Twin Falls counties; and 
one (1) member of the public at large who resides in the state of Idaho 
and is a person of integrity and good reputation who has lived in this 
state for at least five (5) years immediately preceding appointment, who 
has never been registered as a contractor in this or another state, and 
who has never had a substantial personal, business, professional or 
pecuniary connection with a contractor except as a purchaser or owner of 
real property. 
(3) Each member of the board who is a contractor shall serve a term 
of four (4) years and such terms shall be staggered. The initial board 
shall have one (1) ~ember whose term expires July I, 2007; one (1) member 
whose term expires July 1, 2008; one (1) member whose term expires July 1, 
2009; and one (1) member whose term shall expire July I, 2010. The member 
of the board who is a member of the public at large shall serve a four (4) 
year term, which initial term shall expire on July I, 2008. No member of 
the board may be appointed to more than two (2) consecutive terms. 
(4) The board shall meet within thirty (30) days after the 
appointment of all its members and thereafter at such other times as may 
be expedient and necessary for the proper performance of its duties, but 
not less than once during each calendar quarter. At the board I s first 
meeting, the members shall elect one (1) of their number to be chairman. 
The chairman may serve in such capacity for a one (1) year term and may 
not serve in such capacity for more than two (2) consecutive terms. A 
majority of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business. 
httn:lIle!!islature.idaho.!!ov/idstatITitle541T54CH52SECT54-5206PrinterFriendlv.htm 7/3/2012 
Statutes Page 2 of2 
(5) The board may delegate to the bureau chief: 
(a) The power to perform ministerial functions, investigate and 
discipline, hold hearings, appoint hearing officers, summon witnesses 
to appear, administer oaths and take affirmations of witnesses at any 
formal proceeding or before a duly appointed hearing officer; 
(b) The power to appoint competent persons to issue subpoenas, 
administer oaths and take testimony; and 
(c) The power to enforce orders of the board. 
(6) Each member of the board shall be compensated as provided by 
section 59-509(n), Idaho Code. 
(7) On and after January I, 2006, each member of the board who is a 
contractor shall be registered in accordance with this chapter and shall 
be in good standing. 
History: 
[54-5206, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 474; am. 2008, ch. 107, sec. 
l, p. 304.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5207. GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD. The board shall enforce 
the minimum standards and requirements therefor as provided by this 
chapter and by rule adopted by the board. The board may exercise such 
powers and duties as are reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this chapter and it may, among other things: 
(1) Accept or reject applications for registration and establish the 
fees to be charged for application, registration and renewal, subject to 
the provisions of this chapter; 
(2) Hold public meetings and attend or be represented at such 
meetings, within or without the state, prepare and publish rules 
pertaining to this chapter and such other information as may be necessary, 
and furnish copies thereof to those engaged in the business, trade, 
practice or work of contracting and to the public upon request; 
(3) Furnish standards and procedures and prescribe reasonable rules 
for applications, qualifications and registration of contractors, 
including proration of registration fees and staggering initial annual 
registration; and 
(4) Under such rules as it may adopt, investigate, classify and 
determine the qualifications of applicants for registration pursuant to 
this chapter; and 
(5) Contract with the bureau of occupational licenses to provide 
administrative services. 
Hi.story: 
[54-5207, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 475.J 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5208. DENIAL OF LIEN RIGHTS. A contractor who is not registered as set 
forth in this chapter, unless otherwise exempt, shall be denied and shall 
be deemed to have conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real 
property as provided for in chapter 5, title 45, Idaho Code. This section 
shall not operate as a denial of lien rights for any subcontractor or 
independent contractor who is duly registered in accordance with this 
chapter and who is performing services at the direction of another 
contractor, nor shall it operate as a denial of lien rights for any 
employee of any contractor who is not duly registered, or for any supplier 
of materials to such unregistered contractor, so long as such 
subcontractor, independent contractor, employee or supplier did not have 
actual knowledge that such contractor was not duly registered, or who 
reasonably believed that such contractor was duly registered. 
History: 
[54-5208, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 476.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5209. BUILDING PERMITS AND CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION NUMBER -- POSTING 
AT SITE. (I) On and after January 1, 2006, no building inspector or such 
other authority of any county, municipality or district charged with the 
duty of issuing building permits or other permits for construction of any 
type shall issue any permit without first requesting presentment of an 
Idaho contractor's registration number. Such registration number presented 
shall be conspicuously entered on the face of a permit so issued; provided 
however, a permit may be issued to a person otherwise exempt from the 
provisions of this chapter provided such permit shall conspicuously 
contain the phrase "no contractor registration provided" on the face of 
such permit. No authority charged with the duty of issuing such permit 
shall be required to verify that the person applying for such permit is 
exempt as provided in this chapter. 
(2) All building permits or other permits for construction of any 
type shall be posted at the construction site in such a manner that the 
conspicuous statements set forth in subsection (I) of this section are 
visible. 
(3) No person engaged in construction activities who is otherwise 
exempt as set forth in section 54-520~, Idaho Code, shall be required to 
have a contractor registration number. 
History: 
[54-5209, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 476.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5210. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION. (1) An applicant for registration 
as a contractor shall submit an application under oath upon a form to be 
prescribed by the board and which shall include the following information 
pertaining to the applicant: 
(a) Social security number for natural persons or employer tax 
identification number for other persons; 
(b) The name and address under which the applicant conducts business; 
(c) The name and address of each principal, member, partner, 
shareholder, or any other person claiming an ownership interest in the 
business entity for which registration is being applied for; 
(d) A certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to do 
business in the state of Idaho or other satisfactory proof that the 
applicant has procured and has in effect worker's compensation 
insurance or a statement by the contractor as to why such certificate 
or coverage is not required for the applicant; 
(e) A certificate issued by an insurance company authorized to do 
business in the state of Idaho that the applicant has procured and has 
in effect a general liability policy, including products and completed 
operations insurance covering the applicant's construction operations 
in the sum of not less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) 
single limit. The name of the insurance company, the insured and 
policy number shall be made available only to persons or their 
insurers stating that they possess a claim against the contractor; 
(f) A statement of the type of construction to be undertaken by the 
applicant, or such other information as may be required by the board 
pursuant to administrative rules adopted by the board; and 
(g) A statement that the applicant and each principal, member, 
partner, shareholder or any other person claiming an ownership 
interest in the business entity for which registration is being 
applied for herein has never been denied, surrendered or had revoked a 
contractor's license or registration privilege in this or any other 
state or, if a license or registration privilege has been denied, 
surrendered or revoked in this or any other state, an explanation of 
any such denial, surrender or revocation. 
(2) Along with such application, the applicant shall submit a 
registration fee as may be set by the board to cover its administrative 
and enforcement costs, not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per 
year. 
(3) An application for registration that has been denied by the board 
shall be considered a contested case as provided for in chapter 52, title 
67, Idaho Code, and shall be subject to the provisions of that chapter as 
well as the administrative rules adopted by the board governing contested 
cases. 
History: 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54 -5211. REGISTRATION - - RENEWAL. A registration shall be issued for a 
period of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, as 
determined by the board. Each registration shall set forth its expiration 
date on the face of the certificate. No less than thirty (30) days prior 
to the expiration of such registration, the board shall notify a 
registered contractor that such registration is set to expire. 
Reinstatement of a lapsed registration shall require the payment of a 
renewal fee and reinstatement fee in accordance with the administrative 
rules adopted by the board. The failure of any registered contractor to 
renew his registration as required herein and by the administrative rules 
of the board shall not deprive such person of the right to renewal upon 
subsequent application for registration and payment of the required board 
fees. 
History: 
[54-5211, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 477.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5212. DISPOSITION OF RECEIPTS -- EXPENSES. All fees received under the 
provisions of this chapter shall be paid to the bureau of occupational 
licenses and deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the 
occupational licenses fund and all costs and expenses incurred under the 
provisions of this chapter shall be a charge against and paid from said 
fund. 
History: 
[54-5212, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 477.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5213. RECIPROCAL REGISTRATION. (1) On and after January 1, 2007, no 
incorporated municipality, county, al ternati ve form of local government, 
or other municipal or political corporation or subdivision of this state 
shall implement its own program for the registration or licensure of 
construction contractors. 
(2) A contractor may provide a verified copy of any current and 
unrestricted license, registration, or other type of certification granted 
to the contractor by any incorporated municipality, county, alternative 
form of local government, or other municipal or political corporation or 
subdivision of this state issued pursuant to a duly adopted and enacted 
ordinance prior to January 1, 2007, to the board for review, along with a 
reciprocal registration fee not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00), as 
determined by board rule, which is necessary for the administration and 
processing of such application. If the review indicates that the license, 
registration or certification was granted under provisions that were not 
less stringent than those provided by this chapter, the applicant shall be 
issued a registration based upon reciprocal registration. 
History: 
[54-5213, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 478; am. 2007, ch. 183, sec. 
1, p. 531.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5214. REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE -- DISPLAY. (1) Upon receipt of a duly 
completed application, together with the registration fee, and after such 
verification process as the board may from time to time deem appropriate 
by rule, a certificate of registration and a wallet-sized card showing the 
registrant (s name and showing a registration number shall be issued, 
commencing on the date of issue and continuing in effect for a period of 
not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, as determined by 
the board. Application for renewal of registration shall be filed on or 
before thirty (30) days prior to the expiration date. The board shall 
issue a certificate of registration to an applicant upon the applicant (s 
compliance with the registration requirements of this chapter. 
Certificates shall not be assignable nor transferable. Upon any change of 
ownership or a change of address of a registered contractor entity, the 
board shall be notified by such entity within thirty (30) days. A 
certificate of registration, without the payment of a registration fee, 
shall be issued to any person who is granted a public works contractor 
license or a construction manager license, so long as those requirements 
for licensure in Idaho are met. 
(2) A contractor registered pursuant to this chapter shall 
prominently display his contractor registration number for public view in 
his place of business, on advertising, contracts, permits, company or 
business letterheads, and purchase orders and subcontracts within sixty 
(60) days of issue of registration. 
History: 
[54-5214, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 478.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5215. AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE SUSPENSION OR 
REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION. (1) The board may investigate any person 
engaged in contracting within the state of Idaho, or any person believed 
to have acted as a contractor without being duly registered as required by 
this chapter. Upon receipt of a written complaint from a person who claims 
to have been injured or defrauded by such person, or upon information 
received by the board, the board shall perform an investigation of the 
facts alleged against such person. If the board investigation reveals that 
the facts alleged or received are sufficient to proceed with a formal 
action, the board may authorize the filing of an administrative complaint 
against such person and may seek injunctive relief prohibiting such person 
f rom engaging in construction. 
(2) The board shall have the authority to issue informal letters of 
reprimand, suspend or revoke a registration, impose a civil penalty in an 
amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), recover the costs and 
fees incurred in an investigation and prosecution, or to issue a formal 
reprimand against any registered contractor if, after an opportunity for a 
hearing, the board determines that: 
(a) A contractor has violated any of the provisions of this chapter 
including, but not limited to, failure to keep current or provide 
insurance coverage as required by this chapter; 
(b) A contractor has violated any of the provisions of chapte1='~E.iL 
titJ~_~, Idaho Code, relating to consumer protection including, but 
not limited to, making fraudulent misrepresentations to consumers; 
(c) A contractor employed fraud or deception, made a 
misrepresentation or misstatement, or employed any unlawful means in 
applying for or securing registration as a contractor; 
(d) A contractor employed fraud or deception, made a 
misrepresentation or misstatement, or employed any unlawful means in 
applying for or securing a building permit or other permits for 
construction of any type; 
(e) A contractor failed to pay the required fee for registration as 
provided in this chapter; 
(f) A contractor has been convicted of or has engaged in conduct 
constituting a violation of public laws, ordinances or rules of this 
state, or any subdivision thereof, relevant to contracting, reflecting 
on the registered contractor IS ability or qualifications to continue 
contracting for other persons, and making the registered contractor a 
threat to the public safety, health or well-being; 
(g) A contractor has engaged in any other conduct whether of the same 
or a different character than hereinabove specified which constitutes 
dishonest or dishonorable dealings; 
(h) A contractor was grossly negligent or reckless in his conduct in 
the performance of construction. For purposes of this chapter, conduct 
is grossly negligent or reckless if, when taken as a whole, it is 
hthvlllPfTlcl!Oltnrp i(bhn am.rli~<::t~t/Titlp,\4/T,\4rHS?,SECT54-5215PrinterFriendlv.htm 7/3/2012 
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conduct which substantially fails to meet the generally accepted 
standard of care in the practice of construction in Idaho; 
(i) A contractor had a license, registration or certification 
revoked, suspended or refused by this or another state, territory, 
incorporated municipality, county, alternative form of local 
government, or other municipal or political corporation or subdivision 
of this or another state, or omitted such information from any 
application to the board, or failed to divulge such information when 
requested by the board; 
(j) A contractor has been adjudged mentally incompetent by a court of 
competent jurisdiction; or 
(k) A contractor interfered with an investigation or disciplinary 
proceeding by a willful misrepresentation of facts or by the use of 
threats or harassment against any person to prevent such person from 
providing evidence in a disciplinary proceeding, investigation or 
other legal action instituted in accordance with this chapter. 
(3) A contractor whose registration has been revoked or suspended 
shall be required to return his certificate of registration within the 
time determined by the board or, upon a failure to do so, shall be liable 
for civil penalties as set by the board but not to exceed fifty dollars 
($50.00) per day for each day the certificate is not returned after the 
expiration of the period allowed. 
(4) The suspension or revocation of a registration shall be 
considered a contested case as provided for in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code, and shall be subject to the provisions of that chapter as well as 
the administrative rules adopted by the board governing contested cases. 
History: 
[54-5215, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 478.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5216. REINSTATEMENT OF REGISTRATION AFTER DISCIPLINE. The board may 
reinstate a suspended or revoked registration upon a showing that: 
(1) The grounds for such suspension or revocation have been 
eliminated; 
(2) Such a violation is not likely to reoccur in the future; and 
(3) The public interest is not jeopardized by reinstating the 
registration. 
History: 
[54-5216, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. I, p. 480.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
Any person acting in the capacity of a contractor 
wi thin the meaning of this chapter without a current registration as 
herein required shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon 
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not to exceed one thousand 
dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to 
exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the 
discretion of the court. 
54-5217. PENALTIES. (1 ) 
(2) No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a 
contractor, unless otherwise exempt, may bring or maintain any action in 
any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act or contract for which registration is required by 
this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly registered 
contractor, or that he was otherwise exempt as provided for in this 
chapter, at all times during the performance of such act or contract. 
History: 
[54-5217, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5218. ATTORNEY GENERAL -- PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. It shall be the right 
and duty of the attorney general or the prosecuting attorneys of the 
various counties to represent and appear for the people of the state of 
Idaho and the department in all actions and proceedings involving any 
question under this chapter or under any order or act of the board and to 
perform such other services as are required. 
History: 
[54-5218, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 54 
PROFESSIONS, VOCATIONS, AND BUSINESSES 
CHAPTER 52 
IDAHO CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION ACT 
54-5219. SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this chapter are hereby declared 
to be severable and if any provision of this chapter or the application of 
such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid for any 
reason, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining 
portions of this chapter. 
Hi.story: 
[54-5219, added 2005, ch. 153, sec. 1, p. 480.] 
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HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
February 16, 1993 
8:30 A.M. 
Statehouse. Room 412 
Chairman Ahrens, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives 
Alexander, Berain, Crane, Danielson, Judd, King, Lance, 
Loertscher, Newcomb, Stennett, Stoicheff, Stone, 
Sutton, Tippets, Vandenberg and Wood 
None 
See Attached List 










Rep. Wood Iloved, seconded by Rep. Danielson, to approve 
the minutes from the meeting held on February 15, 1993 
as written. Motion carries. 
Rep. Max Black asked the committee to print RS 02341. 
Rep. Crane moved, seconded by Rep. Deal, to send to 
print. RS 02341 with the recommendation that it be 
sent to the Business Committee. Motion carries. 
Rep. Stennett said this was brought to his attention 
for the lack of a mechanism to title watercraft . It is 
protection for the consumer and lender. It will provide 
clear knowledge of ownership. 
Rep. Deal moved, seconded by Rep. Danielson. to send to 
print RS 02S03 with the recommendation that it be sent 
to Mr. Speaker. Motion carries. 
Rep. Stennett said there is no provision for titling 
truck campers ~ " The same argument applies, no way of 
establishing a clear trail of ownership to those 
calipers. 
Rep. Wood moved, seconded by Rep. Judd, to send to 
print RS 02510 with the recomllendation that it be sent 
to Transportati"on Committee. Motion carries. 
Rep. Stubbs said the first part of the bill is simple. 
If you are "a contractor or supplier, you have 60 days 
in which to file a lien after the last day you render 
service. If you are a general contractor. you have 90 
days. Usually a lien is only filed if compensation for 
materials and service is in jeopardy. The second half 
is one that eliminates the possibility for lawsuits. 
It allows someone who is grieved by a lien to post a 
bond and bond around the lien. In essence you start an 
action, you go into court because you have to have 
somebody look at the bond to make sure it is a 
legitimate bond. that the lien creditor is ad~quately 
protected by putting the bond as security instead of a 
lien on the house. 
A brief discussion ensued after which a motion was 
made. 
Rep. Crane moved. seconded by Rep. King, to send to 
print RS 02529 with the recoMmendation to send it to 









8, the sub-committee will review the advisory 
committee. It is the intent of the chair to address a 
recommendation of Tuesday, March 9. 
Kay Manweiler, Occupational Licensing Board, addressed 
the committee regarding protective orders and subpoena 
powers addres-sed in HB 63, dealing with the Accountancy 
Act. Ms. Manweiler addressed these concerns out of 
order of the listed bills, as she would not be 
available to address the Bub-committee later in the 
day. Ms. Manweiler explained the protective order 
seeks to clothe a witness from disclosure when 
necessary. 
Bob Corbell, Idaho Association of Contractors, spoke to 
the committee on HB 305. Mr. Corbell explained HB 305 
extends the deadline for filing a lien for 
subcontractors and material suppliers to 90 days from 
60 days previously, making it consistent with general 
contractors. This will allow all parties 90 days, 
instead of having some at 60 days and others at 90. 
Repre~entative Deal made a motion to send HB 305 to the 
floor with a do pass recommendation. Motion seconded 
by Representation Taylor. Motion passed unanimously. 
Representatives Stubbs and Deal will sponsor the bill. 
Representatives Stubbs presented HB 195 with amendments 
that have been drafted to accompany the bill. HB 195 
dealB with employee leasing companies that operate in 
IdahO. 
Representative Deal liIade a motion to send HB 195 to 
General Orders for amendment. Motion seconded by 
Representative Jones. Motion passed unanimously. 
Representative Stubbs will sponsor UB 195. 
Bob Corbell, Idaho Association of Contractors, 
presented UB 239. HB- 239 will help generate business 
for in-state vendors who supply goods or services to 
state institutions by giving them an advantage over 
out -of-state vendors equal to two percent of the bid 
value or to the amount of a similar preference given to 
the in-state vendors of another state, whichever is 
greater. The question arose as to the retaliatory 
action surrounding states might take. 
Alan Fitzgerald, Executive Director of Buy Idaho, 
encouraged passage of the bill to keep the economy 
flowing in-state. Motion seconded by Representative 
Flandro. Motion passed with Representative Stennett 
voting nay. 
There being no further business before the committee, 
meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m. 
'. '"'""""' 
lON CRANE, CHAIRMAN RUTH ANN SMITH, SECRETARY 
' . ,- '~ ." 
- -,; .. , 
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Case No. CV-OC-2009-04590 
LBACKGROUND 
Presently pending before the Court is a motion filed on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank, 
NA (Wells Fargo) seeking summary judgment against Prowall Drywall & Insulation, Inc. 
(prowall). In support of its motion, Wells Fargo makes three claims: (1) that Prowall was 
precluded from filing liens on the lots that are the subject of this litigation because it hired 
unregistered contractors to perform work on the lots; (2) that Prowall is jurisdictionally barred 
from making a claim to one of the lots because it failed to list Wells Fargo's predecessor-in-
interest's interest in one of the lots in Prowall's complaint; and (3) that Prowall is barred from 
raising new facts that would create an issue of fact because it relies on information that was 
untimely disclosed to Wells Fargo. 
This action arises out of a contract dispute between Prowall and Plainridge, LLC. 
Plainridge hired Prowall to provide labor and materials in the construction of several 
condominiums at Plainridge Place, including Lots 9 and to. In April 2008, Prowall, with the 
Mcmo11lndumDecision AndOrderRe: Motion ForSu mmary Judgment2 
assistance of two subcontractors, Rancho Drywall, a then-unregistered contractor, and B&J 
Drywall & Cleaning, LLC, commenced work by "pre-rocking" the condominiums. Following 
framing inspections in June 2008, Prow all began hanging sheet rock, taping, and mudding. By 
June 17, 2008, Prow all and its subcontractors had completed their work on Lots 9 and 10. 
Claiming it was still owed money for labor and material supplied under its contract with 
Plainridge, subsequently Prowall filed liens against Lots 9 and 10 on July 21, 2008. On May 
21, 2008, after the pre-rocking, but before the hanging of sheetrock, Wells Fargo's 
predecessor-in-interest recorded deeds of trust to Lots 9 and 10. 
On July 21, 2008, Prowall filed lien claims to Lots 9 and 10 with the statutorily 
required contents. Approximately six months later, it commenced this action, naming, among 
others, Wells Fargo's predecessor-in-interest in its complaint. In its complaint, Prowall 
provided the legal description of the two lots it was seeking to foreclose and attached the lien 
claims to the complaint. However, the complaint failed to name Wells Fargo's interest in Lot 
9, naming only its interest in Lot 10. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.CP. 
56{ c); see also Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). In a summary 
judgment conext, the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). 
However, the non-moving party "cannot rest on mere speCUlation because a mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 
McmomndumDecisionAndOrderRe:MolionForSummaryJudgmenl3 
P.2d 360, 364 (1991). The non-moving party may not rely on bare allegations or denials; it 
must set forth specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. Vebillis v. Dependable 
Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,689 P.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1984). However, the disputed fucts are 
construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from 
those facts are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. BMC West, 144 Idaho at 893, 174 
P.3d at 402. 
A. Statutory Penalties for Hiring Unregistered Contractors 
In Idaho, it is "unlawful for any person to engage in the business of ... a contractor ... 
without being registered ... " with the Idaho Contractors Board. I.e. § 54-5204(1). Idaho law 
also makes it "unlawful for a contractor to engage any other contractor who is required ... to 
be registered as a contractor unless such other contractor furnishes satisfactory proof to the 
contractor that he is duly registered .... " I.e. § 54-5204(2). A contractor that does not 
register as required is "deemed to have conclusively waived any right to place a lien upon real 
property" under the mechanic's lien statute. I.C. § 54-5208. Oddly, section 5208 makes clear 
that it does not deny the rights of a registered "subcontractor or independent contractor ... 
who is performing services at the direction of another contractor who is not duly registered ... 
so long as such subcontractor [or] independent contractor ... did not have actual knowledge 
that such contractor was not duly registered." Jd. Furthermore, a contractor that fails to 
register may not "bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection of 
compensation for the performance of any contract for which registration is required .... " I.C. 
§ 54-5217(2). 
Prowall argues that these statutes, read together, do not deny the rights of a registered 
contractor that unknowingly hires an unregistered contractor. Its first contention is that the 
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statute denying lien rights applies only to contractors who are unregistered, and thus cannot be 
applied to registered contractors on the basis of their hiring unregistered subcontractors. It 
argues that because Prowall was a registered contractor at all times during the construction, it 
is entitled to a lien. Prowall further argues that even if the statute applies to contractors who 
hire unregistered subcontractors, a claim is permissible once the previously unregistered 
subcontractor registers. Prow all cites a recent Idaho case to support the proposition that the 
statute only bars recovery by contractors that are unlicensed at the time of commencing an 
action. This court is not persuaded by either of Prow all's arguments. 
Whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to the hiring of unregistered subcontractors is 
an issue of first impression. When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court must 
attempt to give meaning and effect to all the provisions of a statute. Bradbury v. Idaho 
Judicial Counsel, 149 Idaho 107, 116, 233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009). The Court will not presume 
that the legislature enacted superfluous statutes, and the Court will not make surplusage of 
provisions of the statute. Id. At the outset, it is worth noting that whether Prowall knew 
Rancho was unregistered is irrelevant. The statute requires that a contractor not engage a 
subcontractor unless the subcontractor provides satisfactory proof that it was registered. Thus, 
the statute creates an affirmative duty on the part of the contractor to verify the registratiQn 
status of a subcontractor prior to engaging it. Therefore, Prowall's lack of knowledge of 
Rancho's registration status is a failure of that duty, and it is irrelevant whether Prowall was 
aware that Rancho was unregistered. 
As to the issue of whether Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to registered contractors that 
engage unregistered subcontractors, this Court finds that they do apply. The first sentence of 
Section 5208, if read in a vacuum, would apparently operate to deny lien rights only to 
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unregistered contractors, and thus all registered contractors would have lien rights. However, 
that interpretation would render meaningless other parts of the statute. The most glaring is the 
first clause of the second sentence in the statute, which states that the statute will not operate 
to deny the rights of registered contractors operating at the direction of unregistered 
contractors. If the first sentence were to strictly apply only to unregistered contractors 
themselves, that clause would be utterly without meaning, as it only guarantees that lien rights 
will not be denied to a subset of registered contractors, which would not have their rights 
denied anyway. 
The second part of Chapter 52 that would be rendered virtually meaningless would be 
proscription of hiring unregistered contractors. Section 5204 specifically makes it unlawful to 
engage a subcontractor without receiving proof that the subcontractor was registered. If there 
were no penalties applied for violating that provision, it would render "unlawful" virtually 
meaningless. This Court must apply the law in such a way as to give effect to all statutory 
provisions. If this Court were to decline to apply the penalty provision to registered 
contractors who hire unregistered contractors, it would render several provisions of this statute 
meaningless. Thus, this Court finds that penalties of Sections 5208 and 5217 apply to 
registered contractors that engage unregistered contractors. 
As previously noted, Prowall argues that even under this interpretation of Chapter 52, 
it is not barred from filing its lien claims or commencing this action since Ranchero registered 
Prowall filed its lien claims or commenced this action. Prowall relies on Parkwest Homes, 
LLC v. Bamson, arguing that the case stands for the proposition that Section 5208 only bars 
lien claims by contractors that are unregistered at the time of the claim. 149 Idaho 603, _, 
238 P.3d 203, 208 (2010). In that case, a contractor entered into a construction contract prior 
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to registering. Id. Prior to furnishing any labor, the contractor registered. Id. There, the court 
held that a contractor may claim a lien for any work that it performs while registered, and none 
of the work it performs while it is not. Id. Thus, a contractor must be registered at the time 
labor is furnished to be able to claim a lien for the labor. Since the penalties of Chapter 52 
apply to registered contractors that hire unregistered subcontractors, any lien claims arising 
while the unregistered subcontractor is employed are conclusively waived, and no action may 
be brought for collection of debts owed on the labor. Since there is no disagreement that 
Rancho was unregistered throughout all the work performed by Prowall on the Plainridge 
Place Condominiums, Prowall's lien claims and action to collect are barred. 
B. Jurisdictional Bar to Prowall's Claim on Lot 9 
In Idaho, a mechanic's lien claimant must commence its action to enforce its lien 
within six months after filing its lien claim. I.C. § 45-510. If an action to enforce a 
mechanic's lien is not commenced within six months after the lien claim is filed, the lien 
ceases to exist and the court loses jurisdiction to enforce the lien. Bradford v. Palmer, 86 
Idaho 395, 401, 388 P.2d 96, 99 (1963). Thus, whether this Court is barred from enforcing 
Prowall's lien will tum on whether Prowall's complaint was adequate to commence an action 
to enforce its lien on Lot 9. Wells Fargo argues that Prowall has failed to commence its action 
on Lot 9 within the required six months because Prowall failed to name Wells Fargo's interest 
in Lot 9 in its complaint. This Court disagrees with Wens Fargo's contention. 
Contrary to Wells Fargo's argument that Idaho law requires the complaint to list each 
party's interest, "[t]he key issue in detennining the validity of a complaint is whether the 
adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it." Vendlin v. Costeo Wholesale 
Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427, 95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004). Here, Wells Fargo's predecessor-in-interest 
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was named in the complaint, as well as its deed of trust in Lot 10. Attached to the complaint 
were Prowall's lien claims to both Lots 9 and 10, which contained what is statutorily required. 
The complaint contained a legal description of the property Prowall was seeking to foreclose 
on, and it requested in its prayer for relief a judgment foreclosing its claims of lien on Lots 9 
and 10. The complaint was timely filed. This Court finds that Wells Fargo was put on notice, 
and thus Prowall's action to enforce its lien on Lot 9 was commenced within six months. 
C. Lien Priority and Prowall's Discovery Violation 
Finally, Wells Fargo argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to when 
Prowall began its work. Prowall claims that it engaged in "pre-rocking" work in April 2008, 
before Wells Fargo recorded its deeds of trust. Wells Fargo claims that Prowall did not begin 
work until June 2008 at earliest. Wells Fargo argues that the affidavit of Ken Rich and 
attached documents, produced December 30, 2010, contradict Mr. Rich's previous testimony, 
and was produced in violation of LR.C.P. 26(e) and this Court's scheduling order. Wells 
Fargo argues that the documents and affidavit should be ignored to the extent that they 
contradict Mr. Rich's deposition testimony that Prowall began work after framing inspections 
in June 2008. This Court disagrees. 
Whether to exclude testimony or evidence based on a violation of Rule 26(e) is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Schmechel v. Dille,148 Idaho 176,219 
P.3d 1192 (2009). This Court is unwilling to exclude evidence disclosed in violation of a 
scheduling order absent a showing that the late disclosure prejudiced a party. Here, Wells 
Fargo does not contend that it has been prejudiced in any way by the late disclosure of the 
documents. Thus, this Court will not exclude the documents or the information contained in 
the affidavit of Ken Rich. 
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Since the documents and affidavit contain evidence that Prowall began its work on the 
Plainridge Place Condominiums in April 2008, and Wells Fargo did not record its deeds of 
trust until May 2008, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to which interest has priority. 
Since there is a genuine issue of material fact, this Court will not grant summary judgment on 
the theory that Wells Fargo's liens have superior priority. 
In. CONCLUSION 
The Wells Fargo lien is superior to the Prowall claim since Prowall failed to meet the 
specific requirements of the statute required to preserve its lien right; it engaged an 
unregistered contractor to perform the work, thus forfeiting any lien it might otherwise have 
claimed or possessed. Thus, Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment is hereby 
GRANTED. Since Wells Fargo has made no showing of prejudice stemming from Prowall's 
late disclosure of documents, this Wells Fargo's motion to strike and disregard testimony and 
documents is hereby DENIED. Wells Fargo shall prepare a judgment for this Court to sign in 
accordance with this decision and I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS z,....!dayofFebruary, 2011. 
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